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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
DESIGNING NOVEL HARDWARE SECURITY PRIMITIVES
FOR SMART COMPUTING DEVICES
Smart computing devices are miniaturized electronics devices that can
sense their surroundings, communicate, and share information autonomously
with other devices to work cohesively. Smart devices have played a major role
in improving quality of the life and boosting the global economy. They are
ubiquitously present, smart home, smart city, smart girds, industry, healthcare, controlling the hazardous environment, and military, etc. However, we
have witnessed an exponential rise in potential threat vectors and physical
attacks in recent years. The conventional software-based security approaches
are not suitable in the smart computing device, therefore, hardware-enabled
security solutions have emerged as an attractive choice. Developing hardware security primitives, such as True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
and Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) from electrical properties of the
sensor could be a novel research direction. Secondly, the Lightweight Cryptographic (LWC) ciphers used in smart computing devices are found vulnerable
against Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack. The CPA performs statistical analysis of the power consumption of the cryptographic core and reveals
the encryption key. The countermeasure against CPA results in an increase
in energy consumption, therefore, they are not suitable for battery operated
smart computing devices.
The primary goal of this dissertation is to develop novel hardware security
primitives from existing sensors and energy-efficient LWC circuit implementation with CPA resilience. To achieve these. we focus on developing TRNG
and PUF from existing photoresistor and photovoltaic solar cell sensors in
smart devices Further, we explored energy recovery computing (also known
as adiabatic computing) circuit design technique that reduces the energy consumption compared to baseline CMOS logic design and same time increasing
CPA resilience in low-frequency applications, e.g. wearable fitness gadgets,
hearing aid and biomedical instruments.
The first contribution of this dissertation is to develop a TRNG prototype
from the uncertainty present in photoresistor sensors. The existing sensorbased TRNGs suffer a low random bit generation rate, therefore, are not

suitable in real-time applications. The proposed prototype has an average
random bit generation rate of 8 kbps, 32 times higher than the existing sensorbased TRNG. The proposed lightweight scrambling method results in random
bit entropy close to ideal value 1. The proposed TRNG prototype passes all
15 statistical tests of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) Statistical Test Suite with quality performance.
The second contribution of this dissertation is to develop an integrated
TRNG-PUF designed using photovoltaic solar cell sensors. The TRNG and
PUF are mutually independent in the way they are designed, therefore, integrating them as one architecture can be beneficial in resource-constrained
computing devices. We propose a novel histogram-based technique to segregate photovoltaic solar cell sensor response suitable for TRNG and PUF
respectively. The proposed prototype archives approximately 34% improvement in TRNG output. The proposed prototype achieves an average of
92.13% reliability and 50.91% uniformity performance in PUF response. The
proposed sensor-based hardware security primitives do not require additional
interfacing hardware. Therefore, they can be ported as a software update on
existing photoresistor and photovoltaic sensor-based devices. Furthermore,
the sensor-based design approach can identify physically tempered and faulty
sensor nodes during authentication as their response bit differs.
The third contribution is towards the development of a novel 2-phase sinusoidal clocking implementation, 2-SPGAL for existing Symmetric Pass Gate
Adiabatic Logic (SPGAL). The proposed 2-SPGAL logic-based LWC cipher
PRESENT shows an average of 49.34% energy saving compared to baseline
CMOS logic implementation. Furthermore, the 2-SPGAL prototype has an
average of 22.76% better energy saving compared to 2-EE-SPFAL (2-phase
Energy-Efficient-Secure Positive Feedback Adiabatic Logic). The proposed 2SPGAL was tested for energy-efficiency performance for the frequency range
of 50 kHz to 250 kHz, used in healthcare gadgets and biomedical instruments. The proposed 2-SPGAL based design saves 16.78% transistor count
compared to 2-EE-SPFAL counterpart.
The final contribution is to explore Clocked CMOS Adiabatic Logic (CCAL)
to design a cryptographic circuit. Previously proposed 2-SPGAL and 2-EESPFAL uses two complementary pairs of the transistor evaluation network,
thus resulting in a higher transistor count compared to the CMOS counterpart. The CCAL structure is very similar to CMOS and unlike 2-SPGAL
and 2-EE-SPFAL, it does not require discharge circuitry to improve security performance. The case-study implementation LWC cipher PRESENT

S-Box using CCAL results into 45.74% and 34.88% transistor count saving compared to 2-EE-SPFAL and 2-SPGAL counterpart. Furthermore, the
case-study implementation using CCAL shows more than 95% energy saving
compared to CMOS logic at frequency range 50 kHz to 125 kHz, and approximately 60% energy saving at frequency 250 kHz. The case study also
shows 32.67% and 11.21% more energy saving compared to 2-EE-SPFAL and
2-SPGAL respectively at frequency 250 kHz. We also show that 200 fF of
tank capacitor in the clock generator circuit results in optimum energy and
security performance in CCAL.
KEYWORDS: Hardware Security Primitives, True-Random Number Generator, Physically Unclonable Functions, Adiabatic Logic, Cryptography,
Medical Devices, Side-Channel Attack, Correlation Power Analysis Attack.
Amitkumar Dalpatray Degada
December 10, 2021

DESIGNING NOVEL HARDWARE SECURITY PRIMITIVES
FOR SMART COMPUTING DEVICES

By

Amitkumar Dalpatray Degada

Dr. Himanshu Thapliyal
(Director of Dissertation)

Dr. Daniel Lau
(Director of Graduate Studies)

December 10, 2021
(Date)

Dedicated to my Teachers

Thanks for leading me from the darkness of ignorance
to the quest for the immortality of knowledge.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Once Einstein said that It is the supreme art of the teacher to awaken
joy in creative expression and knowledge. I sincerely express my deepest
gratitude to my advisor Dr. Himanshu Thapliyal. My research journey
would not have been possible without constant encouragement, guidance,
and assistance from Dr. Thapliyal. I also thank my committee members,
Dr. Hank Dietz, Dr. D. Manivannan, and Dr. Bruce Walcott for their
insightful suggestions to improve my research. I am deeply grateful to Dr.
Dietz for his unwavering support and discussions on computer architecture,
which have a deep impact on shaping my thoughts.
I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Dr. Vijay Singh for giving
me access to the solar cell research lab for experimental work. My journey at
VEDANT’s (VLSI Emerging Design And Nano Things Security) lab would
not be smooth interactive, and evolving without the support of my colleagues.
I heartily thank Zachary Kahleifeh for helping to learn tools, discussions, and
feedback. I also thank my lab mate Rajdeep Kumar Nath, Edgard MunozCoreas, Carson Labrado, and Wu Yang for their inputs, help, and support.
No words are enough to express the unconditional love of the parents.I
am forever thankful to my father for nurturing patience, leadership quality,
and being the example of performing one’s duties without any expectations.
I also thank my mother for her love and prayers. I also express my profound
gratitude to my Grandparents, family members, and well-wishers for their
unceasing support and encouragement.
I take this opportunity to thank my sister Donata. Before starting the
Ph.D., situations and surroundings asked me to quit my dream. My sister
instilled the faith back in me and this dissertation would not be possible
without her unconditional love and encouragement. I thank my brother,
Akshay for his unparalleled support and for smoothly taking over my social
responsibilities. I also thank my friends, Praneeth, Jujube, and Sairam for
creating many laughter moments and memorable cooking sessions.
Lastly, I thank my Mahadev, I bow down to you. I feel that I am nothing,
it is just his blessing that makes things work. I am also deeply grateful to
all the yogis, and spiritual masters who came across my path of life. I thank
them for answering my questions to know the purpose of life, realizing me
to see the beauty in everything, and steering me to be in union with divine
energy. This has a deep impact on the success of this dissertation.

This work was supported by National Science Foundation grant 1738662
and National Science Foundation career award No. 1845448.

iv

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements

iii

Table of Contents

v

List of Figures

ix

List of Tables

xii

1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 Hardware Enabled Solution in Smart Computing Security framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 Problem Statements and Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3.1 TRNG designed using photoresistor sensors . . . . . .
1.3.2 Integrated TRNG-PUF over photovoltaic solar cell sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3.3 2-Phase Dual-Rail Adiabatic Logic to design secure
cryptographic ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3.4 2-Phase Single-Rail Adiabatic Logic to design secure
cryptographic ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.4 Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.1 Background on Key Security Attributes .
2.2 Security: An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.1 Smart Device: A generalized overview . .
2.2.2 Architecture Layers . . . . . . . . . . . .

v

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

1
3
6
10
10
11
12
13
14
15
15
16
18
18
20

2.3

2.4

2.5
2.6

2.7

2.8

2.2.3 Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Role of Hardware Security Modules in security framework . . .
2.3.1 True Random Number Generator (TRNG) . . . . . . .
2.3.2 Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) . . . . . . . . .
2.3.3 PRESENT: Lightweight Cryptographic Cipher . . . . .
Adiabatic Circuits to design Energy Efficient and CPA Secure
Cryptographic Ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4.1 Adiabatic logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sinusoidal Power Clock Generator for 2-Phase adiabatic circuits
Background on Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) Attack . . .
2.6.1 Side Channel Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.6.2 Procedure to Carryout Correlation Power Analysis (CPA)
Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Performance Metrics for Hardware Security Primitives . . . .
2.7.1 TRNG Performance Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.7.2 PUF Performance Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.7.3 Energy-Efficiency and Security Performance Metrics in
Adiabatic Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Application of Hardware Security Primitives . . . . . . . . . .
2.8.1 Cryptographic operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.8.2 Usage of the PUF for Authentication . . . . . . . . . .
2.8.3 Privacy Preserving Mutual Authentication (PPMA) . .

3 Design of True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
photoresistor Sensor
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Evaluation of Randomness in Photoresistor Sensor . . . .
3.3 Architecture of Photoresistor based TRNG . . . . . . . .
3.3.1 Electronic Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.2 Software Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4 Experimental Setup and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.1 NIST Statistical Test Suite results . . . . . . . . .
3.4.2 Data rate results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21
22
22
24
26
29
29
30
32
34
35
37
37
37
39
40
40
41
41

from
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

43
43
44
46
46
47
48
50
51
51

4 Integrated TRNG-PUF Architecture based on PV Solar Cells
for IoT
53
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
vi

4.2

4.3
4.4
4.5

4.6

Integrated TRNG-PUF Architecture . . . . . . . . .
4.2.1 TRNG bits Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2.2 PUF bits Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2.3 Electrical Schematic of proposed prototype . .
Entropy Extraction Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Iterative Von Neumann (IVN) Processing for TRNG
Performance Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.1 PUF Performance Testing . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.2 TRNG Performance Testing . . . . . . . . . .
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

5 2-Phase Symmetric Pass Gate Adiabatic Logic (2-SPGAL)
to design secure and energy-efficient cryptographic circuits
5.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1.1 Key Contributions from this work . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 Proposed 2-Phase Adiabatic Logic Design . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3 Energy and security evaluation of 2-SPGAL logic gates . . . .
5.4 Case study - PRESENT-80 one round of encryption design
using 2-SPGAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.1 PRESENT-80 implementation using proposed 2-SPGAL
5.4.2 Energy-Efficiency comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5 Energy and Security evaluation of PRESENT-80 S-box design
5.6 CPA Attack on one round of PRESENT-80 encryption design
5.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6 2-Phase Single-Rail Clocked CMOS Adiabatic Logic (CCAL)
to design secure and energy-efficient cryptographic circuits
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.1.1 Key Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.2 Clocked CMOS Adiabatic Logic (CCAL) . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3 Evaluation in Energy-efficiency and Security Metrics performance evaluation of the CCAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3.1 Background on CCAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3.2 Energy-efficiency and security evaluation of CCAL logic
gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.4 A Cryptographic Circuit Case-Study:PRESENT-80 S-box using CCAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.4.1 Importance of S-box in PRESENT-80 . . . . . . . . . .
vii

55
55
56
56
56
58
60
60
62
64

65
66
68
70
71
77
77
78
80
82
83

86
86
88
89
89
90
91
99
99

6.4.2

6.5

6.6
6.7

Transistor Count Saving analysis in CCAL-based casestudy implementation of PRESENT- 80 S-box . . . .
6.4.3 Energy and Security Performance Evaluation of CaseStudy Design PRESENT-80 S-Box . . . . . . . . . .
Effect of varying capacitor and inductor in LC tank in 2N2PPCG for energy efficiency and security performance analysis
in case-study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CPA attack simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 100
. 102

. 105
. 108
. 111

7 Conclusion and Future Directions
112
7.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Bibliography

117

Vita

137

viii

List of Figures
1.1
1.2
1.3

Percentage of cyber-attacks responded by ICS-CERT [1]. . .
Classifications of the IoT attacks [2]. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Modern implantable medical devices requires low-energy consumption and secure cryptographic circuits. . . . . . . . . .
Hardware security primitives in security framework of smart
computing devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IoT Device share and reported security vulnerabilities. . . .
Adiabatic logic as a potential solution to design low-power and
secure cryptographic circuits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.

2
3

.

5

.
.

6
8

.

9

Smart device features [3]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smart Device Architecture layers [4]. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
General schematic of TRNG (© 2020 IEEE). . . . . . . . .
Schematic of strong PUF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Top level description of PRESENT encryption scheme [5]. .
Charging and discharging in adiabatic circuits [6] (© 2020
IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.7 2N2P-PCG [7]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.8 2N-PCG [7]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.9 PCG interfacing with adiabatic logic circuits. . . . . . . . .
2.10 Control signals in 2-Phase PCG design [7]. . . . . . . . . . .
2.11 Side-Channel Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.12 PPMA model [8] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.

18
20
23
24
28

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

30
31
32
33
33
34
41

1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6

3.1
3.2
3.3

Histogram of photoresistor sensor voltage at different light intensity (© 2020 IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Photoresistor-microcontroller Setup to study histogram of sampled voltage (© 2020 IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Hardware setup of proposed TRNG (© 2020 IEEE). . . . . . 46
ix

3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6

4.7

Software schematic of proposed TRNG (© 2020 IEEE). . .
Experiment setup (© 2020 IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Effect of additive scrambling on Entropy at light intensity 0
W/m2 (© 2020 IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Random bit generation rate for proposed TRNG (© 2020
IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Building security primitives from solar cell sensors (© 2020
IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Schematic of integrated TRNG-PUF architecture (© 2020
IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
An example electrical schematic (© 2020 IEEE). . . . . . .
PV solar cell sensor voltage histogram (© 2020 IEEE). . . .
Von Neumann block and corresponding waveforms of output
sequences (© 2020 IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IVN tree structure using Von Neumann blocks. The value at
output sequence is throughput with respect to reference value
1 (input bit sequence) and corresponding value in bracket indicates bias in percentage (© 2020 IEEE). . . . . . . . . .
Reliability and Uniformity as a measure of PUF performance
metric (© 2020 IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 47
. 49
. 50
. 52
. 54
. 55
. 57
. 58
. 60

. 61
. 62

5.1

Adiabatic Logic as preferred choice to design energy-efficient
and secure cryptographic coprocessor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 General SPGAL logic gate structure[6] (© 2021 IEEE). . . . .
5.3 Sinusoidal clocking idea [9], [10] (© 2021 IEEE). . . . . . . .
5.4 Four cascaded adiabatic buffers implemented in cascade using
2-phase clocking scheme [9], [10] (© 2021 IEEE). . . . . . . .
5.5 Uniform current in 2-SPGAL Ex-OR logic gate (© 2021 IEEE).
5.6 NED value comparison for AND logic gate. . . . . . . . . . . .
5.7 NSD value comparison for AND logic gate. . . . . . . . . . . .
5.8 NED value comparison for XOR logic gate. . . . . . . . . . . .
5.9 NSD value comparison for XOR logic gate. . . . . . . . . . . .
5.10 one round of PRESENT-80 implementation using 2-phase adiabatic logic (© 2021 IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.11 NED value comparison for PRESENT-80 S-box. . . . . . . . .
5.12 NSD value comparison for PRESENT-80 S-box. . . . . . . . .

x

67
70
70
71
72
73
73
75
75
77
82
83

5.13 Successful Revelation of Key=14 in on one round of PRESENT80 encryption designed with CMOS (© 2021 IEEE). . . . . . 84
5.14 Unsuccessful CPA attack on one round of PRESENT-80 encryption designed with proposed 2-SPGAL and 2N-PCG. . . . 85
5.15 Unsuccessful CPA attack on one round of PRESENT-80 encryption design with proposed 2-SPGAL and 2N2P-PCG. . . . 85
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.8
6.9
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15

Clocked CMOS Adiabatic Logic (CCAL) gate schematic [11]. .
CCAL-based XOR logic gate waveform with 2N2P-PCG integrated into the design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NED value comparison for AND logic gate. . . . . . . . . . . .
NSD value comparison for AND logic gate. . . . . . . . . . . .
NED value comparison for XOR logic gate. . . . . . . . . . . .
NSD value comparison for XOR logic gate. . . . . . . . . . . .
E avg , NED and NSD metric in CCAL-based XOR logic gate
as a function of the supply voltage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
one round of PRESENT-80 implementation using 2-phase adiabatic logic [10] (© 2021 IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NED value comparison for PRESENT-80 S-box. . . . . . . . .
NSD value comparison for PRESENT-80 S-box. . . . . . . . .
Effect of varying capacitor and inductor values over Average
energy consumption in PRESENT-80 S-box. . . . . . . . . . .
Effect of varying capacitor and inductor values over NED and
NSD in PRESENT-80 S-box. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Energy-security trade-off in PRESENT-80 S-box designed using CCAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Successful Revelation of Key=14 in on one round of PRESENT80 encryption designed with CMOS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Unsuccessful CPA attack on one round of PRESENT-80 encryption designed with CCAL and 2N-PCG. . . . . . . . . . .

xi

91
92
95
95
97
98
98
100
103
104
106
106
107
109
110

List of Tables
2.1
2.2

Smart Device Architecture layer security vulnerabilities. . . . . 21
Objective of different tests in NIST Statistical Test Suit . . . . 38

3.1

NIST Statistical Test Suite results. Result is ’pass’, if p-value
> 0.01 (© 2020 IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

4.1

NIST STS for TRNG evaluation. Result is ’pass’, if p-value
> 0.01 (© 2020 IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

5.1
5.2

Frequency range in medical applications. . . . . . . . . . . .
Energy-efficiency and security evaluation of the 2-phase AND
logic gate with 2N-PCG and 2N2P-PCG. . . . . . . . . . . .
Energy-efficiency and security evaluation of 2-phase XOR logic
gate with 2N-PCG and 2N2P-PCG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Number of Transistor Required to implement PRESENT-80
one round [10] (© 2021 IEEE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Energy consumption (in pJ/cycle) in case study of one round
of PRESENT-80 encryption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Energy saving (in %) comparison in proposed 2-SPGAL based
one round of PRESENT-80 encryption. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Energy-efficiency and security evaluation of PRESENT-80 Sbox design using 2-phase adiabatic logic. . . . . . . . . . . .

5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4

. 66
. 74
. 76
. 78
. 79
. 79
. 81

Energy-efficiency and security performance comparison for AND
logic gate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E avg - Energy saving (in %) in CCAL AND logic gate. . . . .
Energy-efficiency and security performance comparison for XOR
logic gate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E avg - Energy saving (in %) in CCAL XOR logic gate. . . . .

xii

94
94
96
96

6.5
6.6
6.7

6.8
6.9

Transistor count in PRESENT-80 S-box designed using dualrail logic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Transistor count in PRESENT-80 S-box designed using singlerail logic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Transistor count comparison for CCAL, 2-EE-SPFAL [9], 2SPGAL [10] and conventional CMOS for PRESENT-80 S-box
design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Energy-efficiency and security performance comparison for PRESENT80 S-Box. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
E avg - Energy saving (in %) in CCAL based PRESENT-80
S-Box. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

xiii

Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, we have seen the proliferation of handheld portable smart
electronic devices. They have contributed significantly to improving our quality of the life and our life has become inseparable from such ”smart” devices.
The smart devices find applications in smart healthcare, smart home, manufacturing, power generation, military, and controlling hazardous environment
[12] [13]. The growth in the semiconductor industry, machine learning, algorithms, and networking is driving them to widen the spectrum of applications.
It is expected by the year 2025, there will be a total of 45.9 billion smart
devices [14], [15], [16]. In other words, there will be on average at least 6
to 7 devices per person. Further, it is expected that the above figure will
certainly be higher in coming years in the US and many European Nations.
Smart devices are often compact, have limited computational power,
smaller memory, and finite energy budget (i.e. battery operated). Therefore, they are also referred to as resource-constrained devices. Further, they
are deployed at the very last end in the user domain. The broad definition of
such smart devices includes Internet-of-Things (IoT), wireless sensor nodes,
RFID tags, personal healthcare devices, smart biomedical instruments, and
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Such devices often include sensors to collect
information, communicate with each other to work cohesively and execute
functions with minimal human interaction.
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Figure 1.1: Percentage of cyber-attacks responded by ICS-CERT [1].
The cyber-security experts have always raised the alarm on exploitation
of unsecured smart device connected to Internet [17] [18] [19] [20]. The data
shown in Figure 1.1 is based on a report [1] published by Industrial Control
System (ICS) Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT). According to a
recent report published by Nokia, IoT devices are responsible for 32.72% of
total cyber attacks in the year 2020 compare to 16.17% in 2019 [21]. The
attacks on financial sectors result in monetary loss, similarly, attacks on
manufacturing could be hampered, and attacks on transportation may affect
timely delivery. However, the attacks on healthcare devices could threaten
the life of the patient. In recent COVID-19 pandemic has seen 600% increment in phishing in March 2020 and attempts have been made to disrupt the
health-care infrastructure [22]. As the shift to work-from-home began then
the number of attacks on IoT devices incremented up to 46% first six months
and more than half (55.74%) of IoT networks experienced port-scan attack
[23]. Kevin Ashton, who coined the word Internet-of-Things first time in
2009 [24], would not have imagined that the glimpse of such a rise of security
concern in a decade.
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1.1

Motivation

The application of the smart devices has shown unquestionable potential to
transform human well-being. However, they are not perfectly flawless. There
exist many surveys in research literature which have reported various security
attacks possible on smart devices, e.g. IoT, CPS and biomedical devices [18]
[19] [25] [26][27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33]. The above work in literature
points out that the constrained computational power, limited memory size,
relying on battery, lower costs and wide deployment at the user end has given
exponential rise in cyberattacks on smart devices.

Figure 1.2: Classifications of the IoT attacks [2].
It is reported in [34] that 98% of IoT data is unencrypted. It has been
shown that it is very easy for an attacker to bypass the front defense line via
a phishing attack and get access to unencrypted user information and exploit
it later (Figure 1.2). Many incidents have been reported showing the breach
of security in IoT devices. The ”Jeep Hack” demonstrated by Dr. Miller
and Chris Valasek is one of the most widely discussed and popular examples.
They demonstrated the vulnerabilities in sensor communication over CAN
bus and infotainment system allow to take remote control of the vehicle [35].
This resulted in the recall of 1.4 million vehicles. The researcher in [36] has
shown that a correlation power analysis attack (discussed in more detail in
Section 2.6) can be used to identify the encryption key in the smart lamp.
Later, a compromised IoT node can infect the other nodes in the network, and
chain reaction enables the attacker to create a massive DDoS (Distributed
Denial Service Attack). Similarly, the usage of correlation power analysis
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to identify the key in the South Korean public transit system. Later, it
was used to mutually authenticate the transit card and recharge the balance
without any payment. The above incidents imply that a careless security
implementation can have dire effects on the future success of IoT devices.
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are a full-fledged network of smart devices often employed to take input from the physical world and control the
surrounding environment. Research and statistics estimated by Gartner Inc
state that by the year 2023, the financial impacts of the Cyber-Physical
attacks are likely to reach more than 50 billion US dollars [37]. Further,
their close operation to control the physical environment can result in human fatalities. The insurance, compensation given for loss of life, fines by
regulatory bodies, and litigation fees, if included, then the above figure would
certainly be higher. It is not only financial losses, the loss of human lives
can eclipse brand reputation and permanent loss of trust among customers.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) under the
US Department of Homeland Security, publish alerts and advisory on several
cyber-physical attacks from time to time [38]. The above list cyberattacks on
critical infrastructure, e.g. Electric grid, municipal transportation agencies,
HVAC systems, water, and oil distribution systems, and nuclear plants.
The Healthcare sector has an inherent weakness in security infrastructure deployment. Alone in the US, over 110 million patients and 81% of
healthcare organizations reported the compromise of their data in 2016 [39].
The healthcare sector is always an always hot favorite target for two primary
reasons. First, it is a heterogeneous system having reliance on third-party
biomedical instruments, communication and networking infrastructure, and
HVAC, etc. Second, the hacked data is valuable and reach. The medical
records of the patient not only contain healthcare reports and credit card
information, rather, multiple and permanent identifiers that cannot be reset.
Many of the biomedical instrumentation are designed using older technology
and can become an entry point to the healthcare infrastructure. Therefore,
there is a need to secure biomedical devices used in the diagnostic process,
e.g. Magnetic Particle Imaging, Electrical Impedance Myography, Electrical
Impedance Tomography, bioelectrical impedance meter, etc.
Further, the advancement in semiconductor technology and algorithms
development (e.g. Machine Learning, Deep-Learning) have empowered the
inclusion of implantable medical devices, hearing aid, and fitness tracker devices. The above devices are battery operated and their lie span is limited.
Further, their limited computing power and connectivity to the communi4

Figure 1.3: Modern implantable medical devices requires low-energy consumption and secure cryptographic circuits.
cation network makes them easy target (Figure 1.3). In research literature,
it has been already shown that compromised node can perform unauthorized command execution, data transmission [40], deplete the battery [41]
and generating electrical shocks [42] [43]. The compromised security not
only results in data and identity being stolen, however, but it could also be
life-threatening in some cases. The proposed solution to combat the above
security challenges comes at the cost of increased power consumption. Therefore, the security solutions proposed for battery-operated healthcare devices
should be energy-efficient.
To summarize, smart devices are going to be more and more widespread as
we move towards the future of smart cities, smart agriculture, smart traffic
management, autonomous vehicles, telemedicine, and smart biological devices. Smart systems, e.g. IoT, CPS, and connected biomedical devices have
an almost identical infrastructure setup that includes one or more sensors,
a computing unit, communication, and networking infrastructure, and an
actuator to control the output. The attack surface on such devices is going
more and more and a new paradigm shift should be incorporated. In recent
years, researchers have remolded their focus to include hardware-enabled solutions. The primary focus of this dissertation report is to develop security
solutions at the hardware level to strengthen the security infrastructure in
resource-constrained devices.
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1.2

Hardware Enabled Solution in Smart Computing Security framework

Smart devices require the sound implementation of the cryptographic framework to ensure the level of trust in confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The security threats in resource-constrained devices can not only be
looked at in conventional software approaches. The limitation of the resourceconstrained devices and increased challenges due to growing attack vectors
have inspired researchers to design hardware-enabled solutions. The cryptographic operations performed in smart devices can be grouped under a
cryptographic coprocessor (Figure 1.4). The cryptographic coprocessor is
responsible for secure key generation, safely protecting the keys, managing
the keys, performing cryptographic operations, e.g. encryption, decryption,
hashing, and digital signature.

Figure 1.4: Hardware security primitives in security framework of smart
computing devices .
The hardware security primitives are the components that operate at
the root level (i.e. hardware) in the security infrastructure pyramid and
have a dedicated role. True Random Number Generator (TRNG), Physically
Unclonable Function (PUF), block cipher, and stream ciphers are examples of
cyber security primitives. The hardware security primitives, such as TRNG
and PUF come as a plug-and-play module. In the existing literature, many
stand-alone TRNG and PUF design based have been proposed [44] [45] [46]
[47]. Adopting such dedicated solutions in resource-constrained devices is
not suitable.
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The smart devices used in IoT, biomedical applications, and CPS have
some common features. They often include one or more sensors, a computing unit, communication infrastructure, and an actuator. In this research,
we proposed a novel way to design hardware security primitives using the
electrical response of the sensor and its interfacing to the computing unit.
The proposed solutions in this report are suitable for resource-constrained
devices and do not require additional interfacing hardware from sensors and
computing units. The above approach results in space-saving and direct porting of proposed hardware security primitives in existing sensor-based smart
computing devices.
Designing the hardware security primitives can prevent tempering and
malicious replacement of the sensor. The proposed TRNG and PUF modules in the report use the electrical response of the sensor as an entropy
source. It is important to note that if an attacker compromise sensor tempered physically or replaced by a malicious one, then it will not result in the
same response producing different output. The above feature enables the
identification of faulty or compromised nodes easily during the authentication process.
To present the importance of sensor-based TRNG and PUF, let’s look
at some information in the IoT domain. Figure 1.6 illustrates information
compiled from data published in white paper [34] by Palo Alto Networks.
It is very surprising to see that camera only constitutes 5% of IoT devices,
however, they are responsible for 33% of total reported security vulnerabilities. further, the consumer electronics and energy devices contribute 7%
and 6% of total vulnerabilities reported. In summary, 46% of IoT security
vulnerabilities comes from camera, consumer electronics, and energy devices.
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Figure 1.5: IoT Device share and reported security vulnerabilities.
The photoresistor sensor exhibits a change in electrical resistance according to ambient light conditions. It is widely used to activate lights in smart
homes, smart street lighting, phototaxic navigation in robotic tadpoles, intelligent brightness and contrast control in smart televisions, calculating shutter speed in smart cameras, infrared astronomy, infrared spectroscopy, and
optical coding. On the other hand, The PV solar cell sensor is the most preferred mechanism of energy harvesting for mobile IoT devices [48]. Designing
TRNG and PUF using photoresistors and photovoltaic solar cell sensors can
be beneficial in many smart devices. Therefore, In this research, we explored
a novel approach to design TRNG and PUF by exploring the electrical properties of the photoresistor and photovoltaic solar cell sensors.

8

Figure 1.6: Adiabatic logic as a potential solution to design low-power and
secure cryptographic circuits.
Another aspect of smart computing device security is to design low-power
and secure cryptographic circuits, e.g. block ciphers, stream ciphers. The
low-power devices are easy to pray to cyberattacks and can leakage information through a side-channel. Some examples of Side-Channel Attacks (SCA)
are timing, power analysis, fault analysis, cache attacks, and electromagnetic
radiation attacks. Among different SCA, the power analysis-based attacks
are the easiest to implement and popular among attackers. The CMOS-based
cryptographic circuits have distinguishable power consumption traces for different operations. A successful Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack, a
type of SCA, can be carried out to reveal the secret key. The conventional
approach to secure cryptographic circuits often results in higher power consumption. It makes them difficult to get adopted in resource-constrained
devices. Therefore, designing an energy-efficient and secure cryptographic
cipher is an intriguing research direction.
In this dissertation, we explore the energy recovery-based circuit design
technique, also known as an adiabatic logic circuit. The adiabatic logic circuit
recovers the charge stored in their load capacitor, rather than dissipating
it as heat. Further, the adiabatic logic circuit has nearly uniform power
traces, unlike the conventional CMOS logic. Therefore, adiabatic logic-based
circuit design can disguise the information processed. The proposed energy
recovery-based solutions are resilient against CPA attacks and improve the
energy consumption requirements.
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1.3

Problem Statements and Contribution

In this section, we present the problem definition and key contribution at
abstract. The first two problems covered are suitable for the existing sensorbased smart devices. The last two problems address the issue to strengthen
the cryptographic circuit against CPA attack, a type of side-channel attack.

1.3.1

TRNG designed using photoresistor sensors

Problem Statement 1:
The True Random Number Generator (TRNG) provides random bits from
a physical phenomenon. The random bits are used as seed value in cryptographic key generation circuit, zero-padding, nonce (number only used once)
value, salt value bits, initialization vector, and digital signature, etc. The
TRNGs are generally designed using transducer or sensors (to convert physical phenomenon in corresponding electrical signal), followed by an amplifier
to boost the signal and post-processing algorithm that removes the statistical
dependence to generate random bits. In this research problem, we intend to
identify a sensor that has electrical properties that can remove the need for
external interfacing electronic hardware, and generates quality random bits
at a faster speed.
Key Contribution 1:
In this part of the research, we propose the design of a quality random bit
generator designed using photoresistor sensors. The photoresistor sensor is
widely used in many embedded computing applications, e.g. detecting the
change in lighting conditions to activate lights in smart homes and smart
street lighting, phototaxic navigation in robotic tadpoles, controlling brightness and contrast in smart televisions, designing heartbeat sensors in smart
healthcare, calculating shutter speed in smart cameras, light-activated control circuitry in smart consumer electronics and designing detector for infrared astronomy, infrared spectroscopy and optical coding [49] [50].
 We identified that the electrical properties of the photoresistor sensor
are highly suitable for quality random bit generation at a higher rate.
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 We proposed a novel additive scrambling process in the post-processing
technique suitable in resource-constrained devices. The proposed technique results in a higher random bit generation rate and Shannon entropy value close to 1.
 The proposed TRNG framework does not require external electronic
hardware for amplification and interfacing. Thus, the proposed TRNG
can be ported on existing photoresistor sensor-based devices easily.

1.3.2

Integrated TRNG-PUF over photovoltaic solar
cell sensors

Problem Statement 2:
The Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) is an important hardware security primitives in an embedded computing framework. The PUF can be
thought of as analogous to human biometrics. The response of the PUF is
used for the device ID, encryption key generation, and secure key storage.
The PUF exploits manufacturing variation in device fabrications to generate a static bit pattern. On the other hand, TRNG transforms the random
nature of the entropic source (i.e. electrical response of the sensor) into random bits. Therefore, it is very challenging to integrate the fundamentally
orthogonal structure of the TRNG and PUF as one unit. In this part of
the research, we explored the possibility to unify TRNG and PUF over the
sensor-microcontroller interface.
Key Contribution 2:
The photovoltaic (PV) solar cell sensors are the preferred way of harvesting
energy in many small computing devices in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
and Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. We explored the electrical response of
the PV solar cell to design an integrated TRNG-PUF architecture.
 We propose a novel method histogram-based method to split the response that enables the integration of two architecturally orthogonal
primitives, TRNG and PUF around PV solar cells.
 The Iterative Von Neumann post-processing results in an improvement
in throughput by approximately 34%.
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 The proposed prototype shows promising results for TRNG and PUF
responses together.
 The proposed prototype can easily be ported over existing PV solar
cell sensor-based devices as there is no need for external hardware for
interfacing.

1.3.3

2-Phase Dual-Rail Adiabatic Logic to design secure cryptographic ciphers

Problem Statement 3:
Modern medical devices are collect the physiological information of the patient, communicate to the cloud, and are often battery-powered. Designing
energy-efficient and secure cryptographic circuits in low-frequency medical
devices are challenging. The adiabatic logic circuits are low-energy solutions
and can withstand the CPA attack. In this part of the research, we proposed
a novel two-phase sinusoidal clocking implementation called, 2-SPGAL for
existing adiabatic logic, Symmetric Pass-Gate Adiabatic Logic (SPGAL).
Key Contribution 3:
The key contribution in this research is summarized as follow:
 This work presents 2-SPGAL, a novel 2-phase sinusoidal clocking implementation of Symmetric Pass Gate Adiabatic Logic (SPGAL).
 The energy and security of the adiabatic logic largely depend upon the
PCG integrated into the design. Therefore, we evaluated the energy
efficiency and CPA-resistance of the proposed 2-SPGAL with two different types of synchronous resonant Power Clock Generators (PCGs).
Two types of PCGs are 2N2P-PCG and 2N-PCGs.
 The case-study implementation of the cryptographic circuit using proposed 2-SPGAL shows on an average around 50% improvement in energy efficiency compared to CMOS-based counterpart. over the frequency range of 50 kHz to 250 kHz in biomedical device applications.
 The case-study implementation using proposed 2-SPGAL shows on an
average approximately 23% improvement in energy consumption compared to another 2-phase adiabatic logic solution, 2-EE-SPFAL [9].
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 We demonstrate that the case-study circuit designed using novel 2SPGAL can successfully defend the encryption key against the CPA
attack However, the encryption key is revealed in the same counterpart
design using CMOS.

1.3.4

2-Phase Single-Rail Adiabatic Logic to design secure cryptographic ciphers

Problem Statement 4:
The 2-EE-SPFAL and 2-SPGAL produce two outputs at the logic gate, Vout
and Vout , thus known as, Dual-Rail adiabatic logic. The dual-rail adiabatic
logic uses two transistor switching networks to evaluate the logic output.
Therefore, it results in higher transistor counts compared to its CMOS counterpart. Reducing the transistor count in Dual-Rail adiabatic logic is necessary for area-constrained portable devices. Further, a reduction in transistor
count results in energy-saving design. In this part of the research, we explored a novel single-rail Clocked CMOS Adiabatic Logic (CCAL) to design
an energy-efficient and secure cryptographic circuit.
Key Contribution 4:
The key contributions of this work are as follows:
 The CCAL can be an alternate choice for low-energy and CPA-resistant
medical devices.
 The case-study implementation saves more than 95% energy for the frequency range 50 kHz to 125 kHz and approximately 60% more energysaving at 250 kHz compared to its CMOS counterpart. The above
energy saving can be highly beneficial to designing low-power cryptographic circuits.
 The case-study implementation shows a significant saving of transistor
count compared to dual-rail adiabatic logic 2-EE-SPFAL [9] and 2SPGAL [10].
 We present the effect of varying tank capacitance in 2N2P-PCG over
energy efficiency and security performance.
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 The single-rail CCAL based circuitry removes the need for discharge
circuitry required in its dual-rail counterpart. It helps to reduce the
external need for the control signals for discharge circuitry.
 We demonstrate that the case study designed using CCAL can successfully defend the encryption key against the CPA attack. However, the
encryption key is revealed in the same counterpart design using CMOS.

1.4

Thesis Organization

The organization of the report is as follows. Chapter 2 presents the need for
security in embedded computing, the role of the hardware security primitives
to combat security threats, and their performance evaluation metrics. The
first two Chapters are presenting the design of the hardware security primitives designed from sensor-microcontroller interfaces. Chapter 3 presents
the proposed prototype of TRNG using photoresistor sensors. In Chapter 4,
we explain the novel design to integrate TRNG and PUF over photovoltaic
solar cell sensors. The subsequent two chapters present the circuit-designed
technology to design energy-efficient and secure cryptographic hardware using adiabatic logic. In chapter 5, we present the novel 2-phase sinusoidal
clocking implementation of dual-rail adiabatic logic 2-SPGAL. In Chapter 6,
we explored Clocked CMOS Adiabatic Logic (CCAL) to design secure cryptographic circuits with further improvement in energy efficiency and reduction in transistor counts compared to work reported in the previous chapter.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation report.
The work presented Chapter 3 is published in IEEE conference [51].
Chapter 4 is published in IEEE Consumer Electronic Magazine Journal [52].
The work presented in Chapter 5 is presented as a IEEE conference [10] and
currently under review in IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics [53].
The work presented in Chapter 6 is currently under review in the IEEE Open
Journal of Nanotechnology [54].
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
The objective of this chapter is to give an idea about the importance of security in smart devices. We also illustrate some of the key security issues
and the scope of the research presented in this dissertation report. We discuss the importance of hardware security primitives, TRNG, and PUF. We
also discuss the general design of the TRNG and PUF. We also present the
background related to the energy recovery logic (i.e. Adiabatic logic). We
also illustrate the procedure to carry out Correlation Power Analysis (CPA)
attacks without going into deep intense mathematics. The chapter concludes
with an explanation of evaluation metrics in hardware security primitives and
their potential application listed in the literature.

2.1

Introduction

Over the years, there has been a substantial increment in security attacks
on smart devices. The attacker studies the smart device, trying to sort the
information based on what may work or may not work, then exploit the
vulnerabilities present in heterogeneous connected devices. Further, the IoT
devices are easy to attack and typical attacks can be completed within 5
minutes [18]. some of the key vulnerabilities are listed as follow [3]:
 Eavesdropping: This is intercepting the communication happening
between two IoT devices. The information gathered can be later exploited to plan a bigger attack.
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 Privacy: The information gathered through eavesdropping can be
used to explore unauthorized access.
 Data-tampering: The attacker gets unauthorized access and can alter
the confidential information happening over the network.
 Spoofing: The attacker communicates with the IoT nodes with false
identity (impersonating as legitimate). A successful impersonating attack enables the attacker to spoof confidential user information.
 Code Tempering: The resource-constrained nodes are relatively easy
to pray. The research literature has some examples, in which an attacker can install a malicious patch of the code to affect the performance
of the network.
 Physical availability: The attacker can alter or damage the sensor
or its property. This results in the transfer of an erroneous message
from the sensor front end and can hamper the overall function of the
system.
 Denial of Service (DoS): The DoS and Distributed DoS (DDoS)
attack over IoT is getting frequent attention in news. The attacker
makes thousands of IoT nodes as ”boat” and carries out the DoS/DDoS
to halt the operation of a huge network.
 Accessing restricted part of the network: The communication
infrastructure is consists of several heterogeneous technologies (e.g. WiFi, Bluetooth, ZigBee, etc.) and thus requires gateways. Further, there
is no specific communication protocol for IoT devices (e.g. TCP/IP).
This results in a back-door to get access to an unauthorized part of the
network.
 Authorization attack: The attacker gets access to the node without
a proper credential and later it can be used for malafide intention. The
unavailability of the process to determine the authentication results in
an authorization attack.

2.1.1

Background on Key Security Attributes

Cybersecurity is a very broad topic and the basic purpose is to establish the
level of trust in the user. A completely secure system should possess the
16

following properties, viz., confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity,
and non-repudiation [55]. In this section, we give an abstract idea about the
application of TRNG-PUF to maintain the above properties. TRNG and
PUF design will be described in detail in the later part of the chapter.
 Confidentiality: The objective of this property is to ensure that only
intended users have an ineligible message. The messages are encrypted
and decrypted using cryptographic algorithms. The IoT nodes are
resource-constrained, thus over the years, researchers have proposed
lightweight cryptographic algorithms. The cryptographic algorithms
are classified in the following categories based on the number of keys:
Symmetric (one key) and Asymmetric (use two keys namely: public
and private). Data Encryption Standard (DES), Advanced Encryption
Standard(AES) [56], Rivest-Shamit-Adleman (RSA) [57], RC2, and
RC6 had been traditionally implemented with lower-key size [58]. However, the modern algorithm, e.g. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
[59, 60] and PRESENT [5] are becoming more popular. The primitives
presented in this report, TRNG and PUF can be useful to generate
the key for cryptographic algorithms, provide an initialization vector
in ciphers.
 Integrity: The integrity property guarantees the correctness of the delivered message. Hashing is a common method employed to check that
the message is not tempered and altered. The WHIRLPOOL, PHOTON, and Secure Hash Algorithm-3 (SHA-3) family implementation
for IoT are examples of hash functions [61, 62]. The input of arbitrary
size results in a unique fixed-length output. The Salt bits (generated
from TRNG) can be used as an additional input to hash functions to
safely store the passwords.
 Authenticity: The authenticity validates that the only trusted device
be part of the system. The IoT nodes are sometimes deployed into an
area where monitoring every physical device is next to impossible. The
attacker may forge or temper the sensor or nodes. Authenticity determines that the message is coming from trusted parties. The PrivacyPreserving Mutual Authentication (PPMA) protocols use, both TRNG
and PUF responses to mutually authenticate server and IoT node [8].
More detail about PPMA will be explained later in the chapter.
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 Availability: This is a very crucial property in IoT security. The
attackers have used denial of service (DoS) and distributed denial of
service (DDoS) flooding attacks on IoT devices to restrict the availability of the system [63].
 Non-repudiation: This property ensures that either sender or receiver does not deny any aspect of authenticated communication happened. The successful implementation of this property protects, sender,
and receiver from malicious communication intent. One possible way
to implement non-repudiation is by introducing Digital Signature (DS).
The TRNG bits can be useful as one of the inputs to create DS[64] [44].

2.2

Security: An Overview

The security issues in smart devices are happening at a very rapid pace.
Smart connected devices are often a collection of different platforms, technology, communication infrastructure, and physical system. It is challenging
to present a unified device architecture that can cover all aspects. The primary objective of this section is to present the security challenges that exist
at the device and different layers of the system architecture. The term smart
device is a broad umbrella that covers IoT devices, smart healthcare devices,
and cyber-physical systems.

2.2.1

Smart Device: A generalized overview

Figure 2.1: Smart device features [3].
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In this dissertation, we are restricting our discussion only to resource-constrained
devices. The infrastructure in smart connected devices, e.g. IoT, CPS, and
smart healthcare devices is almost identical. The IoT devices are widely
studied and can serve as a baseline to explain the vulnerabilities in security
in such devices. The authors in [3] describe three essential features, viz., specific characteristics, relations between characteristics, and interfaces. The
overall idea is represented in Figure 2.1.
Smart Device Characteristics
Processor, addressability, identification, and localization form the important
features that set the characteristics of the smart Device.
 The embedded processor enables the computational processing based
on received inputs and answers to the request coming from the application or internet.
 The important feature of the associating device to address to facilitate
its identification and routing of the message via routing is enabled by
addressability.
 The features that make the unique identity of the device (e.g. MAC
address, Unique ID) is the goal of identifications.. The PUF can also
serve to give unique identification to the device.
 The localization enables the device to get related to its actual physical address. The last feature may not be needed in every device. However, this becomes extremely important when the resource-constrained
device is implemented in a large geographical area, e.g. agriculture,
military, etc.

Relationship between characteristics
The sensor, actuators, cooperation among devices, and network communication technology are the key components in this feature. Their functionality
altogether helps interact with the physical world and the Internet.
 Communication enables the devices to transmit, and receive the messages over the network. ZigBee, Wi-FI, Bluetooth, Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID), and Low-Power Wide Area Networks (LPWANs)
are some examples of communication mediums.
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 The large set of devices should cooperate with other IoT devices for
the collective goal of activities and application.
 The sensor enables the device to capture the information from the
physical environment and provides input to the processor for necessary
tasks, and communication to other parts of the network.
 The actuation refers to the ability to operate in the surrounding physical environment. This feature completes the application of the task.
It is important to note that every device (e.g. fitness trackers) may not
have an actuator.

Interface
The interface helps the user to interact with the object, view the information, allow necessary settings, and permit the desired modification based on
the inputs. It is important to note that there exists no standardization in
interfaces. The interface is usually referred to as the environment created
in software. Even though there exist many challenges, we will restrict the
discussion only specific to the hardware point of view.

2.2.2

Architecture Layers

Figure 2.2: Smart Device Architecture layers [4].
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There exist many different methodologies to describe the architecture layers
(Figure 2.2). There are four layers are, viz., perception, network, middleware,
and application. The perception layer uses sensors to collect the information
and other constituent hardware parts. The objective of the network layer is
to provide communication with other nodes and network components. The
layer between, network and application is named the middleware layer. The
objective of the middleware layer is to store the data in the cloud, analyze it,
and take intelligent decisions. Further, the scalability and inter-operability
depend upon an efficient middleware layer. The application layer provides
the interface to the user for the intended application.

2.2.3

Security Issues

In this section, we will see some key challenges and issues needed to address
security. The classification of security vulnerabilities at different architecture
layers will enable us to understand the specific need and likely direction of
the research. Table 2.1 lists some of the key IoT security issues and how they
can be safeguarded.
Table 2.1: Smart Device Architecture layer security vulnerabilities.
Architecture Security Vulnerability
Layer

Affected security
Parameters

Perception
Layer
Network
Layer

Device Capturing, Device impersonation,
compromises in cryptographic key management
Spoofing, Altering information, Replaying
false routing

Confidentiality, Integrity,
Availability
Authentication, Integrity

Middleware
Layer

malicious code insertion, affecting decision,
false multi-party authentication

Confidentiality, Integrity

Application
Layer

Creating issues in data access, protection, and retrieval Access control,
software vulnerabilities attack
Confidentiality

The perception layer is consists of the sensor, actuators, and their communication infrastructure connecting them to the network layer. The significant
issue in the perception layer is to identify between correct and abnormal devices. Attackers can temper, compromise, disable, or destroy the node. These
kinds of nodes can be referred to as faulty nodes. We will describe later in
the chapter that the output of the PUF can be used to create a unique device identification. Further, key management is a key issue in the perception
21

layer. It has been demonstrated that storing a local key is susceptible to
side-channel attacks. The TRNG and PUF are key components to generate
a secure key. The TRNG and PUF presented in this report are designed from
sensors and the microcontroller. These features free up the requirement of
secure memory storage and make nodes resilient against side-channel attacks.
The network layer carries a large amount of the data, and vulnerabilities can expose to congestion in the network. Authentication and Integrity
are the key security concerns at the network layer. The common attacks
at the network layer are replay, DoS/DDoS, Man-in-the-Middle (MITM),
and malicious code injection. The literature shows the PUF as a promising
component in authentication protocols in IoT [65–68].
The middleware layer process the bulk of the data coming from the network layer and takes a decision based on processing. One of the key features
of this layer is to filter between valid data and malicious data. Successful
cyberattacks can transmit false data, and that can even lead to halt system
operations. The application layer provides personalized services. Some key
examples of attacks at the application layer are malicious code injection,
spear-phishing attacks, cease the device to stop receiving update patches.

2.3
2.3.1

Role of Hardware Security Modules in security framework
True Random Number Generator (TRNG)

Random Number Generators (RNG) are classified as Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) and True Random Number Generators. The PRNG
is also sometimes called Algorithmic and TRNG as Physical due to their
underlying mechanism to operate. The key thing in PRNG is to decide the
polynomial, which can be based on
 Fibonacci series based polynomial
 Galois LFSR. It is found more efficient compare to its Fibonacci seriesbased LFSR.

The PRNG is primarily dependent upon maximum length LFSR designed
using primitive polynomials. The PRNG response is periodic, and the value
22

of periodicity depends upon the size of the register. For example, the periodicity of m registers PRNG is 2m−1 bit. The word periodicity and sequence
length are often used interchangeably in the literature. A single response
of m-bits possesses all the necessary properties needed in random numbers.
However, they fail collectively.
The algorithms are deterministic in nature. In other words, certain inputs
will always result in the same output. The attacker can forcefully reset the
operation and can access different input-output combinations. Thereby, it is
possible to speculate about the seed value and overall PRNG response. This
makes a standalone PRNG response a poor choice in cybersecurity,
High-quality randomness is the utmost requirement in cybersecurity. A
true random number generator (TRNG) is a hardware component that generates a string of random bits based on a non-deterministic physical phenomenon as a source of randomness. In recent years many researchers have
attempted to use inherent noise in the electronic device, such as Johnson
noise, shot noise, Zener noise or random variation in sensor response to design TRNG [44].
The noise source used to generate TRNG bits should possess a high entropy value. The higher entropy from the source results in quality random
bits. Low entropic sources are easy to attack. Unlike the ASIC-based TRNG,
the sensor-based TRNG can offer the easily perform entropic profile of the
noise source. The entropic profile of the random bits can help to speculate
the ability of the TRNG to withstand attack.

Figure 2.3: General schematic of TRNG (© 2020 IEEE).
TRNG is crucial in many cybersecurity operations, such as asymmetric
and symmetric key generation, Digital Signature (DS) creation, initialization
vector in the block and stream ciphers, and salt value generation for secure
storage. In the existing literature, free-running oscillators (FRO), ASIC,
and FPGA-based TRNGs have been explored [44]. Considering the growing
importance of the IoT nodes, TRNG designs using existing sensors and microcontrollers have also been explored by researchers in recent times. Figure
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2.3 illustrates a generalized design of a sensor-based TRNG.
The existing sensor-based TRNGs have explored sensors, such as accelerometer [69–71], fuel cell [72], hydrogen gas [73], inertial measurement
unit (IMU) [74], ECG [75] and RFID [76]. The existing sensor-based TRNGs
have a preprocessing module to sample-amplify-filter raw sensor signal [69,
72, 73, 75, 76] or to remove stationery patterns [70] or to add randomness
in raw sensor signal[74], before being utilized to extract random bits by
post-processing algorithms. The inherent properties of the sensors and preprocessing modules in existing sensors-based TRNG make them suffer from
a lower random bit generation rate. For example, the maximum average
random bit generation rate in sensors-based TRNG is 250 bps, to the best of
our knowledge [71]. As sensors-based TRNG can be designed with minimal
redesign costs and minimal performance, area, and power penalties, thereby
a faster implementation needs to be developed.

2.3.2

Physically Unclonable Function (PUF)

The PUF was first proposed in [45]. The PUF is a hash function, for a
given input resulting in a unique outcome. The PUF uses the minor inherent
variation in the device to generate a unique static response. The inherent
variations (e.g.jitter, delay) in properties are not controllable and predictable,
thus it becomes practically impossible to clone the model. The inputs are
commonly referred to as challenges and outcomes as the response. The different inherent variations of each PUF will make different responses to the
same challenge.

Figure 2.4: Schematic of strong PUF
Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) has emerged as a low-cost tool
for hardware authentication and cryptographic key generation. It consists of
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two parts: sensor and operational part. The sensor (Optical, Silicon, Coating, LC) part is difficult to clone as no one can match the same underlying
manufacturing process variation, which makes it difficult to clone. The operational part generates a response based on the computational algorithm
to create a similar or near similar response. The researchers have made the
PUF which can be categorized into either Silicon IC-based PUF or Sensorbased PUF. The major advantage of the sensor-based PUF is that it can be
designed from the sensors already employed in the system and the testing of
the design becomes easier.
There are various methods to design PUFs. In the Ring Oscillator (RO)
based PUF, the series connection of the NOT gates is used to generate oscillating output between two voltage levels. As the delay of each gate is not
universal and it depends upon the physical process manufacturing variation,
the delay will be random, and it can be used to create a unique response for
PUF [45] [77].
In the optical PUF, a laser beam is imparted on material doped with
a scattered transparent material to generate a speckly or freckled response.
This response depends upon the angle of the incident laser wave, doping of
the material, and orientation of the material. The laser beam incident at the
same angle on different materials will not produce the same output which
can be used to generate unique response [45] [77].
The LC PUF, e.g. Piezo, has a coil and a capacitance from the metallic
body, which is not unique due to process variation in the manufacturing of
each sensor. This results into different resonance frequency which can be
used as unique identifier for each sensor [45] [77]. PUFs are categorized into
two subgroups:
 Strong PUF: It has a large set of challenge-response pairs. This is a
critical property in device authentication.
 Weak PUF: Only generates unique signature bits. Used to give seed
bits for cryptographic key generation

The natural variation in the manufacturing procedure makes PUF, an
alluring choice in many security applications. It would be only possible to
attack the system if the attacker or adversary gets the actual PUF being
implemented. Many attempts have been made to incorporate PUF into a
variety of applications such as key storage, unique device id generation, and
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to check the authenticity of the hardware connected in the network. To
detect the malicious insertion of the hardware, the scheme that is employed
is that during the initial booting process every sensor puts its signature to
verify its identity.
The response of the PUF can be used in cryptographic algorithms to
generate the secret key which is not required to be stored in secure memory.
This can lead to the removal of costly secure memory storage as a secure key
derived from the response of the PUF itself. Further, the uniqueness of the
PUF properties makes challenges useless without having access to the actual
PUF.
It is proposed by M. Feiri, J. petit, F. kargl et al. in [78] that PUF can
be easily incorporated into IoT security infrastructure. It has been demonstrated in [79] by authors that PUF can also be useful to prevent Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks. This requires authentication from the central monitor
to authenticate any IoT node to communicate.

2.3.3

PRESENT: Lightweight Cryptographic Cipher

The objective of this section is to illustrate the importance of the Lightweight
cryptographic cipher in resource-constrained devices. In this research, we
have selected PRESENT, a lightweight cryptographic cipher for case-study
implementation. The case-study implementation of the PRESENT designed
using adiabatic logic is compared for energy efficiency and security performance with its baseline counterpart designed using conventional CMOS logic.
We explain the background information about the PRESENT algorithm later
in this section.
Background on Lightweight Cryptographic Ciphers
The emerging applications, e.g. IoT, Cyber-Physical Systems, distributed
control systems, sensor networks, and health care devices, have many batteryoperated and wirelessly connected devices. These devices operate in incoherence to accomplish certain functions. The previously proposed cryptographic
solutions for desktop or server environments are not suitable for such areaconstrained devices. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
recognized the need for Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) [80].
The cryptographic algorithms are divided in two categories. First, Asymmetric cryptography (also known as public-private key cryptography), which
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is used primarily in secure-key exchange, digital signature, etc. Second,
symmetric-key cryptography, which finds application in encryption and decryption of bulk data. Symmetric key cryptography is also referred sometimes
to as secret key cryptography as both sender and receiver use a common key.
The processing operations in symmetric key cryptography mostly involve
XORing and permutations. The symmetric key cryptographic algorithms
are further classified in Block ciphers and stream ciphers.
Stream cipher uses the same key length as data block size and encrypts
a single bit at a time. A few commonly used lightweight stream ciphers are
Espresso, Chacha, eStream, Trivium, Grain 128, and WG-8. The stream
ciphers have a longer setup time, and their throughput is lower. The current
research literature on stream ciphers do not provide significant advantages
for their implementation in resource-constrained devices [81] [82] [83].
On the other hand, block cipher operates on a fixed size of data blocks
and round-key derived from the stored secret key. In research literature,
Block ciphers have been shown as as one of the block (other two are PRNG
and hash function) to build challenge-response protocol based secure identification system [5] [84] [85] [86] [87] [88]. Further, the block cipher has relatively higher throughput and fewer area requirements compared to stream
cipher in resource-constrained hardware. HIGHT, mCrypton, SEA (Scalable
Encryption Algorithm), TEA (Tiny Encryption Algorithm), KATAN, and
PRESENT are some examples of the block ciphers [83] [89]. We selected the
PRESENT as a case-study implementation for the following reasons.
 The authors in [83] [89] have shown that the throughput and arearequirement are optimum in PRESENT implementation compared to
other block ciphers.
 PRESENT has a simple architecture, and better security [5]. This
makes it a suitable candidate for security applications in resourceconstrained devices.
 Beside the encryption process, the PRESENT can be used for authentication within challenge-response protocols [89] [90].
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PRESENT encryption algorithm

Figure 2.5: Top level description of PRESENT encryption scheme [5].
The PRESENT block cipher consists of identical 31 rounds of the operations.
The data block length is 64 bit and the key length comes in two variants of
80-bit and 128-bit. Based on the key length, there are two different versions,
PRESENT-80 and PRESENT-120. Figure 2.5 shows the top-level algorithmic description of the PRESENT algorithm. Each of the 31 rounds has three
primary operations, summarized below [5].
1. addRoundKey: Out of 80-bit of the key, 64-bit is derived and XORed
with the 64-bit of the plaintext data block.
2. S-BoxLayer: The Substitution-Box (S-Box) takes a 4-bit input and
does the non-linear transformation to generate 4-bit output. There is
a total of 16 identical S-Box are required to implement one round of
PRESENT encryption.
3. P-Layer: The Permutation-Layer (P-Layer) is a bit permutation on
the output of the S-Box. The P-layer can be implemented in hardware
by aliasing the wires. There is not a requirement of any processing
elements, e.g. transistor.
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The decryption process in PRESENT is achieved by performing the above
operation in reverse order. Considering the simple hardware design, better
throughput, improved security, and suitability for the resource-constrained
devices, we decided to implement PRESENT-80 one round of encryption
circuits as a case-study implementation. In subsequent chapters, we show
an apple to apple comparison between proposed adiabatic logic-based and
CMOS logic-based implementation for energy-efficiency and security performance comparison.

2.4

Adiabatic Circuits to design Energy Efficient and CPA Secure Cryptographic Ciphers

The countermeasure against power analysis attacks (e.g. CPA attack) can be
classified as masking [91], random instruction injection [92], non-deterministic
processors [93], random register renaming [94], secure co-processors [95], and
cell-level countermeasures [96]. In cell-level countermeasure, e.g. adiabatic
logic, the focus is on designing logic gates with uniform power traces. Further, the charge recovery operation makes adiabatic logic an attractive design
choice for energy-efficient and CPA-resistant IMDs. The objective of this section is to give the background adiabatic logic. Additionally, the commonly
used metrics in literature to evaluate the security of the cryptographic hardware are discussed.

2.4.1

Adiabatic logic

To reduce the energy consumption, the adiabatic logic design technique recycles the energy stored in capacitive load back to the power clock circuit.
The capacitive load is charged using the constant current source, rather than
the conventional approach to use the constant voltage [97]. The constant
current source is practically achieved by a ramp referred to as a power clock.
The generalized switching model, charging and the discharging path of the
adiabatic logic is shown in Figure 2.6.
Ediss =

RC
2
CVdd
T
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(2.1)

Figure 2.6: Charging and discharging in adiabatic circuits [6] (© 2020 IEEE).
Equation 2.1 shows the energy consumption in adiabatic logic circuits.
In equation 1, T is charging or discharging time-period, load capacitor C,
adiabatic logic-based circuit resistance R, and V dd is the full-swing voltage
of power clocking signal. Equation 1 helps to understand that adiabatic circuitry has significantly low energy consumption for low-frequency operations
compared to standard CMOS.

2.5

Sinusoidal Power Clock Generator for 2Phase adiabatic circuits

The adiabatic logic systems consist of primarily two main components. First,
the adiabatic circuit was designed using adiabatic logic cells. The second, the
Power Clock Generator (PCG) circuit. The PCG supplies the power clock for
adiabatic circuit operation, and the stored charge is recovered back to PCG.
The poor design of the PCG can result in non-efficient adiabatic operation
and less energy saving. Therefore, the energy and CPA resilient capability of
the adiabatic system needs to be evaluated with PCGs integrated with the
design.
The PCGs are broadly classified in step-wise charging PCG and resonant
clock generators. The oscillator-based resonant generator can recover the
charge stored in the load capacitor back to the inductor. Further, the higher
power conversion efficiency makes it more suitable for the adiabatic logic
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Figure 2.7: 2N2P-PCG [7].
operation. The synchronous resonant are found to be more energy-efficient,
and its example includes 2N-PCG and 2N2P-PCG [7]. The circuit diagram
for 2N-PCG and 2N2P-PCG is shown in Figure 2.7 and Figure
ref2N-PCG respectively. The 2N-PCG has two NMOS transistors, hence,
referred to as 2N-PCG. The two inductors of the same value are interfaced
with dc voltage equal to half of the full-swing voltage required. Similarly,
2N2P-PCG has two PMOS and two NMOS transistors. 2N2P-PCG requires
only one inductor, and dc supply equal to full-swing voltage.
The schematic to interface the proposed adiabatic logic-based circuitry
with synchronous PCGs is shown in Figure ??. The synchronous resonant
PCG uses an external time-base signal. The external time-base signal allows adiabatic circuitry to synchronous with other non-adiabatic circuits in
a larger system. The differential operation of the adiabatic logic makes the
lumped capacitance value independent of the frequency of the operation.
Thus, the change of frequency operation can be achieved by varying the
external inductor value.
f0 =

1
q
2π L
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(2.2)
C
2



Figure 2.8: 2N-PCG [7].
The 2N2P-PCG requires four external time-base signals. The external
time-base signals can help to synchronize the adiabatic circuits in larger
conventional non-adiabatic circuits. Figure 2.10 shows the external timebase control signals used to operate 2N2P-PCG. The 2N2P-PCG generates
two out-of-phase signals by two identical circuits operating in a lock-step
manner. The operation frequency of the 2N2P-PCG is given by Equation
2.2. CCAL logic requires two out-of-phase sinusoidal power-clock signals,
V P C and V P C. Figure 2.9 shows the interfacing of 2N2P-PCG with the
adiabatic logic circuits.
The timing diagram of the external control signal is shown in Figure 2.10.
The two external control signals CK1 and CK2 are out-of-phase with each
other.

2.6

Background on Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) Attack

The recent growing concern on devise security has made the researcher to
focus on exploring both possible attack and defensive strategies. To build
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Figure 2.9: PCG interfacing with adiabatic logic circuits.

Figure 2.10: Control signals in 2-Phase PCG design [7].
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a suitable defensive policy, it becomes important to understand potential
vulnerabilities and exploitation. Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) is one such
growing concern that compromises device security. In this section, we present
background information on SCA. For the scope of the research presented in
this dissertation report, we illustrate power analysis-based SCA later in this
section.

2.6.1

Side Channel Attack

Implementing the cryptographic algorithm in hardware lead to side-channel
attacks. The primary objective of the Side-Channel Attack (SCA) is to reveal the secret key used in the cryptographic circuit. SCA hypothesizes that
the physical output of cryptographic circuits, e.g. heat, power consumption, electromagnetic radiations, timing to carry out particular operations
correlate with the internal state of the cryptographic circuit.

Figure 2.11: Side-Channel Attack.
Figure 2.11 demonstrates the concept of the SCA at abstract. The researcher in [98] described 10 different possible SCAs. Among them, the
timing analysis attacks [99], fault attacks [100] and power analysis attacks
[101], [91] are commonly employed. Further, the power analysis attack is very
simple to implement, less costly and found more lethal to reveal the key used
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in the cryptographic circuit. Any novice programmer with simple knowledge of electrical wiring can easily carry out a power analysis attack. They
have become the first choice of many attackers in recent times. Therefore,
we focused primarily on defending the cryptographic circuit against power
analysis attacks.
The power analysis attacks are performed by observing the power consumption traces of cryptographic devices. There are three main power analysis attacks: Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks, Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks, and Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks. In each
power analysis attack, the power traces are collected from the cryptographic
device during the data-encryption process being carried out.
In SPA, the collected power traces (or current) are graphically interpreted
over a period of time. The DPA is the next evaluation in the power analysis
attack after SPA. DPA computes the difference of the mean (thus called the
difference of means power attack by some researchers). If the difference comes
out to be zero, then two power traces are not correlated. If the two power
traces are correlated then the difference will be a non-zero value. The larger
number of traces results in two advantages. First, the smaller correlation can
become apparent with time as trace size becomes larger. Second, the noise
gets effectively canceled out in the subtraction process.
The DPA suffers the problem of the ghost peaks, i.e. some peaks in
correlation value occur for the wrong guesses. Sometimes, they appear larger
than the actual key value, thus resulting in a wrong key guess. The practical
problems associated with ghost peaks are explained in detail in article [102].
On the other hand, CPA requires fewer traces. DPA on average needs 30%
more power traces compared to CPA. Therefore, we used the CPA attack to
measure the vulnerability of the designed cryptographic circuit.

2.6.2

Procedure to Carryout Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) Attack

The procedure to perform the CPA and DPA can be explained in three steps.
Out of which the first two steps are exactly similar, and they differ only at the
last step. Algorithm 1 describes the CPA process. In CPA, the assumption is
that the attacker knows the cryptographic algorithm, however, the electronic
circuit that performs the cryptographic process is unknown. The objective
of the CPA is to reveal the encryption key used in the cryptographic circuit.
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The procedure to perform the CPA is described below.
Algorithm 1 Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack.
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:

T = (T1 , T2 , . . . , TN ) ← Known Plain-Text
E [ ] ← Every Possible Encryption for known Plain-Text
HWi [ ] ← Hamming Weight
ρk ← Correlation Coefficient
Perform Cryptographic Circuit Power Traces Collection Procedure
{Pi1 | i = 1, 2, . . . , N } ← Power Traces for each T
for each key, kj ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n } do
Calculate E [ ] = S − Box(T1j ⊕ kj )
{HWj (x1 ) | j = 1, 2, . . . , N } = Hamming W eight(E[ ])
ρ = Pearson Coefficient (HWi , Pi )
return Best Candidate = arg max ρ

1. The attacker prepares the known plain-text inputs (T ) of size N. Collect
the power traces (P ) from the device under attack for each plain-text
input. The power traces (or current traces) can be obtained at the
power supply terminal and ”real-value” load device, e.g. oscilloscope.
2. The attacker prepares the hypothetical power model. First, for each
known plain-text is encrypted using all possible key-value E = S −
Box(Tj1 ⊕ kj ). The S-Box does a non-linear transformation of the ciphertext. The S-Box transformation is known in the public domain as
a part of the cryptographic algorithm. Second, the attacker calculates
the Hamming Weight (HW), i.e. number of non-zero bits, for each
encrypted output.
Cov(HW, P )
p
ρ(HW, P ) = p
Var(HW ) Var(P )

(2.3)

PN
ρ(HW, P ) = qP
N

i=1



HWi − HW Pi − P
2 qPN
2
HWi − HW
i−1 Pi − P

i=1

(2.4)

3. The attacker performs the correlation procedure between the hypothetical power model developed (step 2) and collected power-traces (step
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1). The best key candidate is speculated for the correlation matrix
(ρ(HW, P )) that has the highest absolute sum value. The CPA uses
Pearson Coefficient (Equation 2.4) to calculate correlation value.

2.7

Performance Metrics for Hardware Security Primitives

The TRNG and PUF are fundamentally different in design, and their usage. Thereby, the evaluation criteria are different. This section explains the
performance metrics to evaluate the TRNG and PUF. Further, we also explain the performance metrics to evaluate the energy efficiency and security
performance of the adiabatic circuits.

2.7.1

TRNG Performance Metrics

The randomness of the TRNG is evaluated by the various test suite, such as
Diehard, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), TESTU01,
and FIPS 140-2. The Statistical Test Suite (STS) created by NIST is a
comprehensive report taking a gander at different parts of arbitrariness in
a long succession of bits. It was developed after DES was proven to be
hackable. It is a significant apparatus to figure out the randomness of the
TRNGs.
15 different statistical tests are evaluated. Every test is based on the
calculation of chi-square variation (χ2 ) to calculate the p-Value. Table 2.2
summarizes the objective of each test in NIST STS.

2.7.2

PUF Performance Metrics

Reliability
This parameter is the measure of how likely the PUF will be able to produce
the same response at a different time and under different external conditions.
k
0
1 X HD Ri , Ri,t
Reliability = 100% −
k i=1
n
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(2.5)

Table 2.2: Objective of different tests in NIST Statistical Test Suit
Test
Number

Test Name

Purpose

1

Frequency

To find Proportion of 1s and 0s

2

Frequency Test
within Block

To find proportion of 1s and 0s within a block in given sequence

3

Runs

To find the total number of uninterrupted sequence of bits

4

Longest runs of
1s and 0s

To find longest run within a block in given sequence

5

Binary Matrix
Run

To find the linear dependence in fixed length sub-strings to
original string of bits or sequence

6

Fourier Transform

To detect the periodic feature in given sequence

7

Non-Overlapping
Template

To find the prespecified target sequences in the given block.
If the pattern is not found then the test window is incremented by 1 bit

8

Overlapping
Template

To find the occurrence of prespecified target bit patterns

9

Maurer’s Universal
statistic

To find the number of bits in two matched sequences

10

Linear complexity

It is based on Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR).
The generated sequence should have same complexity as LFSR

11

Serial

To find the frequency of all possible overlapping sequence

12

Approximate
Entropy

It compares the frequency of two consecutive length
overlapping sequence with expected result

13

Cumulative

To check that cumulative sum of sequence is too large
or small

14

Random Excursion

To find the visit of cumulative sum within cycle is as per random sequence
is as per random sequence

15

Random Excursion
Variant

To find the number deviation in expected visit to
sequence from various random walks


0
In equation 2.1, the HD Ri , Ri,t
is Hamming Distance (HD) between
0
the reference response Ri and the instantaneous PUF response, Ri,t . Further,
k represents different number of PUF instances created. The ideal value of
the PUF Reliability should be 100%.
Uniformity
The metric uniformity tells that how much balance the response of the PUF
is. This is an indication that the generated response should have the same
number of ones and zeros in the response bit pattern. The following equation
38

defines uniformity.
n

1X
Uniformity =
Ri,l ∗ 100%
n i=1

(2.6)

Where, Ri,l represents the ith bit of a n-bit response generated by PUF.
Uniqueness
Uniqueness metric indicates how well the copy of the PUF is unique to its
own and different from other copies of the same PUF design. It requires a
large number of PUF copies to evaluate the criteria.

2.7.3

Energy-Efficiency and Security Performance Metrics in Adiabatic Circuits

The CPA has proven its success, and its widely used by malicious cyber
attackers against, both asymmetric and symmetric cryptographic algorithms
[102]. The adiabatic logic maintains the uniform current traces. The benefit
of the adiabatic logic should be evaluated by its ability to withstand the CPA.
The common metric used to check the robustness of the hardware against
CPA are Normalized Energy Deviation (NED) and Normalized Standard
Deviation (NSD) [6] [103] [104] [105] [106] [107].

N SD =

(Emax − Emin )
Emax
v
u N
X (Ei − Eavg )2
1 u
t
=
Eavg k=1
N

N ED =

(2.7)

σ
Eavg

(2.8)

The NED value is the difference between the maximum and minimum
energy consumption for all possible input combinations. NSD is the deviation
of the instantaneous energy to the average energy consumption. Lower NED
and NSD value show that the hardware is less exploitable to the CPA. For the
success of the CPA attack, the hypothetical power model (calculated based
on hamming weight) should be linearly proportional to actual side-channel
leakages. Thus, less deviation in power traces makes it difficult to reveal the
encryption keys.
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2.8

Application of Hardware Security Primitives

In this section, we will see the usefulness of TRNG and PUF in different
cryptographic operations. The researchers in [44, 108, 109] have described
the role of the TRNG and PUF in IoT security.

2.8.1

Cryptographic operations

Traditionally, a secure memory is used to store the secret key. However,
it has been shown by researchers that this memory is not resilient against
cyber attacks. Key generation using TRNG and PUF is one of the most
common applications in IoT. Having either PUF or TRNG can remove the
requirement of the key generation. The advantage of the PUF is that it is
impossible to clone them. The response of the TRNG is unpredictable, and
hence the usage of it in key generation makes it practically impossible to
speculate the key.
If the TRNG has passed the NIST-STS testing then it guarantees there
exists enough randomness in TRNG response [110, 111]. A high entropic response of the TRNG is a suitable candidate to be used as a key in symmetric
encryption. However, in reality, the response of the TRNG bits can always
be checked that it satisfies certain properties for the key as needed in symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic algorithm [71]. The researchers in [112]
provided detail explanation for various Key-Derivation Function (KDF). The
scheme uses an approach called the extract-then-expand approach. It consists of two modules, randomness extractor (TRNG) and Pseudo-Random
Function (PRF) generator. The TRNG bits are used as seed bits, which
later are expanded by PRF. Further, the response from the TRNG can be
used as an initialization vector in a cryptographic cipher. The TRNG bits
are the preferred direction to be used as salt bits, padding bits in hashing
[44].
The PUFs are the most preferred way to replace the secure key generation mechanism, secure key storage keys, and their management. The PUF
response is used as a seed to the circuit which can generate the key every
time it is needed. This frees up the requirement of secret storage. The secure
memory is costly and slower in the speed of operations. The uniqueness property of the PUF allows storing the challenge in insecure memory. Though,
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challenges may be known, however as every PUF responds differently. Thus,
the response of every PUF used to derive the key will be different.

2.8.2

Usage of the PUF for Authentication

The PUF can provide unique identification among the many IoT devices
connected. The traditional authentication scheme works mostly based on
providing credentials, e.g. passwords, digital certificates, etc. The passwordbased mechanism is not suitable in IoT. Many IoT devices can cause the
issue of password dependency, and it’s very challenging to bind access to the
request coming from a particular IoT device. Further, the authentication
protocol needs to be lightweight. Over the years many lightweight authentication protocols on PUF based authentication are proposed [113–122]. The
PUF is a promising candidate that works on the challenge-response pair
mechanism, however, it still requires storing the challenge-response pair at
the verifier end. The researcher in [65] has proposed the scheme which blends
the usage of PUF with Identity Based Encryption (IBE) for authentication.
The proposed scheme in [65] is found resilient against synchronization attack,
replay attack, token-server impersonating, and Dos/DDoS.

2.8.3

Privacy Preserving Mutual Authentication (PPMA)

Figure 2.12: PPMA model [8]
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The Privacy-Preserving Mutual Authentication (PPMA) uses a repeated
challenge-response mechanism. It requires the presence of the TRNG and
PUF together. The objective of the scheme is to authenticate the IoT device. It is assumed that the PUF id of the node is communicated to the
server earlier via a secret channel. The R1, R2 are the two random numbers and PUFi represents the unique id generated using PUF. The scheme is
explained in following steps [123] [8].
1. The server encrypts the random number (R1) using the PUF ID of
the IoT device to be authenticated. The encrypted R1 is passed as a
challenge to the IoT node.
2. The IoT devices decrypt the challenge and get the R1. The R1 is added
with a new random number (R2) from the TRNG of the node.
3. The IoT node creates two encrypted copies using PUF ID for random
numbers R2 and R1+R2. The encrypted message is sent back to the
server.
4. The server recovers the two encryption message, and successively derive
the original R1. If the received and transmitted copies of R1 are the
same then the IoT device is authenticated.
It is important to note that we are not transmitting the PUF ID directly.
The key advantage of the PPMA is that, though eavesdroppers can listen
to the encrypted message, however, it will be not intelligible. Further, the
symmetrical usage of R1 and R2 enables the mutual authentication of server
and IoT devices. The addition of R1 with a local copy of R2 ensures the
receiver that even if the R1 would not have sufficient entropy, however, its
PUF ID is encrypted with full entropy (R1+R2). Also, the IoT node sending
the two digital signatures (encrypted with R2 and R1+R2) can limit the
scope for an attacker to rely on multiple traces with a common secret key.
Thus, in PPMA, the attacker is limited to having access only to the encrypted
copy of the message [123] [8].
The PUF produces the static bit response, and TRNG produces dynamic
bit responses from the same entropy source. Hence, the design of TRNG and
PUF is orthogonal. The architecture proposed in Chapter 4 can be suitable
for the PPMA scheme.
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Chapter 3
Design of True Random
Number Generator (TRNG)
from photoresistor Sensor
True Random Number Generator (TRNG) is an essential hardware security
primitives. TRNG can be thought of as a mathematical function that samples
some source of randomness (e.g. noise, variation in the electrical response
of the device due to manufacturing variation). Designing the TRNG from
randomness present in the electrical response of the sensor is a novel research
direction.
The research work presented in this chapter was previously published in
[51] as A. Degada and H. Thapliyal, “Harnessing uncertainty in photoresistor
sensor for true random number generation in iot devices,” in 2020 IEEE
International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE), pp. 1-5, © 2020
IEEE.

3.1

Introduction

In this chapter, we propose a True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
design that is designed by exploring randomness present in the electrical response of the photoresistor sensor. The true random bits generated from the
TRNG can be used directly as zero-padding, nonce (number only used once)
value, salt value bits, initialization vector, and digital signature, etc. The
encryption key generation from TRNGs are carried out in two different ways
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[124]. First, for lightweight cryptographic cipher (the key size is typically less
than 128 bits), the output from TRNGs can be used directly [125]. Secondly,
for the conventional cryptographic algorithms, the true-random bits can be
used as seed value in cryptographic key generation algorithms to generate
key of larger size (e.g. 2048 bits, 4096 bits) [124] [126] [127].
The photoresistor sensor is widely used in many embedded computing
applications, e.g. detecting the change in lighting conditions to activate
lights in smart homes and smart street lighting, phototaxic navigation in
robotic tadpoles, controlling brightness and contrast in smart televisions,
designing heartbeat sensors in smart healthcare, calculating shutter speed in
smart cameras, light-activated control circuitry in smart consumer electronics
and designing detector for infrared astronomy, infrared spectroscopy, and
optical coding. The proposed design is constructed from components that
are common in smart computing devices such as microcontrollers and existing
photoresistor sensors.
In this chapter, we first illustrate the evaluation and photoresistor sensor
as a source of randomness. It is followed by a discussion on the hardware
and software setup of the proposed TRNG prototype. The TRNG response
bit performance and discussion are followed subsequently. Lastly, we summarized the important contribution.

3.2

Evaluation of Randomness in Photoresistor Sensor

A practical Analog to Digital Converter (ADC) in a microcontroller has
Root Mean Square (RMS), quantization, and code-transition noise. Our
software framework does not involve any steps to remove such ADC noises.
Thereby, we hypothesized that voltage across a photoresistor sensor sampled
by microcontroller ADC can result in variations across some of the least
significant bits (LSBs). The variation in LSBs due to slow response time, nonlinear characteristic, and ADC noise serve as a practical proof of randomness.
To evaluate randomness, we set up (as shown in Figure 3.2) a voltage
divider circuit using a photoresistor sensor and 10 kΩ resistor connected
between supply and ground voltage of a microcontroller(TivaTM C series
TM4C123GH6PM in our setup). The ADC of the microcontroller was configured to sample the change in voltage across the photoresistor sensor and
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Figure 3.1: Histogram of photoresistor sensor voltage at different light intensity (© 2020 IEEE).
supply voltage. The setup was placed inside a light chamber that facilitates
change in light intensity from 0 W/m2 (Extreme Dark) to 40 W/m2 (Normal
Surrounding light). Figure 3.1 shows the histogram of 488 voltage readings across a photoresistor sensor. It can be observed from Figure 3.1 that
the histogram has near-uniform voltage distribution (over ≈ 200 mv range)
at every light except for a slightly skewed distribution at 0 W/m2 (extreme
dark). Hence, the photoresistor sensor has a prospect to work as a source
of randomness. The technique to mitigate close distribution of photoresistor
voltage at 0 W/m2 is explained later in this chapter.

Figure 3.2: Photoresistor-microcontroller Setup to study histogram of sampled voltage (© 2020 IEEE).
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3.3

Architecture of Photoresistor based TRNG

In this section, we evaluate the uncertainty of photoresistor as a measure of
randomness and explain the electronic hardware and software framework for
proposed TRNG. We assume that the microcontroller’s CPU operation and
its memory are resilient against attack.

Figure 3.3: Hardware setup of proposed TRNG (© 2020 IEEE).

3.3.1

Electronic Hardware

The electronic hardware of the proposed TRNG is shown in Figure 3.3. It
has eight photoresistor sensors connected with the ADC pins of an ARM
Cortex-M4 microcontroller (we implemented a prototype using PDV-P8104
photoresistor and TivaTM C series TM4C123GH6PM microcontroller). The
photoresistor sensors in IoT nodes are usually configured in arrays and manufacturing process variation causes each sensor to respond differently, even at
the same ambient light condition. This results in more uncertainty and can
help to achieve a faster random bit generation rate. The interfacing to PC is
done via Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART) to transmit
random bits for NIST STS testing. The UART interfacing can be omitted
in a standalone TRNG system.
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3.3.2

Software Framework

Figure 3.4: Software schematic of proposed TRNG (© 2020 IEEE).
The software framework (shown in Figure 3.4) for the proposed TRNG
implements post-processing algorithms to extract 128-random bits. The goal
of the software framework was to make it as simple as possible to get adapted
in resource-constrained embedded computing nodes in IoT. It has two major
chunk operations, categorized based on the place of execution. The first part
is implemented inside the microcontroller and it is an obligatory portion.
The second portion, implemented inside PC, is discretionary and used to
determine the health of random bits. The second portion is not part of the
final design and once the randomness is validated it is dropped off. The
following major operations are performed in the software framework:
Sampling
The 12 bit ADC has 0.8 mv resolution, which is sufficient to detect typical
variations of 200 mv in photoresistor voltage at a given light intensity. The
sampled voltage of the same sensor is compared with the previously sampled
voltage of the sensor to generate a bit. The bit is ’0’, if the sampled ADC
voltage is the same or less, otherwise it is ’1’.
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Debiasing
The first bits generated from sensor voltages are usually biased and debiasing
is required to produce the random bits. There exist several debiasing techniques, for example, cryptographic hash functions, deterministic extractor
functions, resilient functions, and correcting functions[44][76]. In this research work, the von Neumann correcting function is chosen due to its lower
computing and memory requirements. These properties are highly desirable
for the proposed TRNG to get adapted for implementation in lighter IoT
nodes. The von Neumann correcting function rejects any successive occurrence of bit ”00” and bit ”11”. The bit sequence ”01” and ”10” is accepted
as bit ’0’ and bit ’1’ respectively.
Ex-OR with LFSR output bits
This part is the key and core of the TRNG framework. When sensors response
is changing slowly and sampled at high frequency, we observed that in the
worst case they may produce raw bit strings of repeated ”10” or ”01” of some
bit length. It would result in an uninterrupted sequence of identical bits (i.e.
long runs) at the output of the von Neumann correcting function. The true
random source is expected to have runs of 0s and 1s of different lengths with
expected frequency. However, too many or too small lengths of runs and
with high-frequency results in poor randomness. One possible solution to
reduce long-biased bits is to sample the sensors at a low rate, however, it
could result in a lower random bit generation rate.
In our proposed prototype, we do the Ex-OR operation (Ex-ORing with
LFSR bits) of two 128 bit chunks: First from the output of the von Neumann
debiasing function and other from software implemented 32-bit maximum
length Linear feedback Shift Register (LFSR). We chose 32 bit LFSR because
it has a large period of 4294367295 bits and can provide different 128-bit
chunks at each Ex-Or operation. We will show in the next section that this
method fixes the lower entropy at the dark light condition and removes the
problem of long runs of 1s and 0s.

3.4

Experimental Setup and Results

The ideal TRNG should work independently from changes in the quantity
being sampled. The proposed TRNG was subjected to varying light condi48

tions inside a light chamber, as shown in Figure 3.5. The NIST STS has 15
tests to validate randomness[110]. We collected 1 million bits (one sequence)
at light intensity 0 W/m2 (extreme dark) to 40 W/m2 (normal sunlight). A
test with a p-value ≥ 0.01 indicates that the sequence is random with 99 %
confidence and the test is passed.

Figure 3.5: Experiment setup (© 2020 IEEE).
The efficacy of the additive scrambling (Ex-ORing with LFSR bits) approach can be checked in two ways, first by entropy measurement and second
by passing NIST tests. Figure 3.6 uses Shanon’s entropy equation to plot
entropy for random bit sequence and validate the claim of improved entropy
at dark light. The entropy after additive scrambling is ≈ 1, which indicates
high uncertainty. Further, it is evident from the first two test results in Table
3.1 that additive scrambling helps to pass all 15 NIST STS test.
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Figure 3.6: Effect of additive scrambling on Entropy at light intensity 0
W/m2 (© 2020 IEEE).

3.4.1

NIST Statistical Test Suite results

Each NIST STS test checks a random bit sequence for a unique purpose,
which is listed in NIST guideline[111]. Due to the abrasive nature of the random bit sequence, the criteria for each test is different. The non-overlapping
template, random excursion, and random excursion variant test have 148, 8,
and 18 sub-tests respectively. The p-value for the above tests is an average
value of all sub-tests in Table 3.1. Further, to perform random excursion
and random excursion variant tests, the random bit sequence should pass
the frequency test and has several cycles greater than 500 [111]. The term
not applicable (n/a) in Table 3.1 points out that the relevant test is skipped
due to an insufficient number of cycles by the test suite.
The exhaustive test for randomness verification was performed to find
anomalous behavior of the proposed TRNG. We collected 100 sequences to
subject to NIST STS testing. The natural environment was simulated by
randomly varying light conditions from extreme dark to full at a random
interval. Further, we obstructed light falling on any randomly chosen sensors
at a random time during operation. Table 3.1 lists the p-value for exhaustive
tests and is practical proof that the prototype can tolerate the change in
ambient light.
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Table 3.1: NIST Statistical Test Suite results. Result is ’pass’, if p-value >
0.01 (© 2020 IEEE).
Test name

p-value
Ex-OR LFSR
without
with

p-value at different light intensity
0 W/m2

10 W/m2

20 W/m2

30 W/m2

Exhaustive Test
40 W/m2

p-value

Proportion

Frequency
0.000000 0.156099 0.227307 0.923738 0.083471 0.939268 0.548669 0.816537
0.9900
Block frequency
0.000000 0.927501 0.954847 0.739690 0.828306 0.241850 0.343236 0.851383
1.0000
0.000000 0.126651 0.279898 0.762967 0.058918 0.989132 0.535035 0.096578
0.9900
Cumulative sums (forward)
Cumulative sums (reverse)
0.000000 0.249778 0.248341 0.673262 0.075123 0.965337 0.489175 0.514124
0.9800
0.000000 0.866566 0.870771 0.105751 0.246265 0.446113 0.559371 0.455937
1.0000
Runs
Longest run
0.000000 0.864463 0.687594 0.873904 0.096038 0.435841 0.842273 0.289667
1.0000
0.004280 0.250500 0.669781 0.903934 0.608650 0.281791 0.964394 0.759756
0.9900
Rank
FFT
0.000000 0.453635 0.264045 0.556518 0.217423 0.812934 0.756450 0.978072
0.9800
0.000000 0.469966 0.488747 0.481182 0.501738 0.511771 0.551411 0.501522
0.9879
Non-overlapping template (148)
Overlapping template
0.000000 0.567448 0.898972 0.332220 0.266956 0.883922 0.557932 0.494392
0.9800
0.000000 0.762748 0.101559 0.273205 0.096837 0.883723 0.189590 0.383827
0.9900
Universal
Approximate entropy
0.000000 0.753883 0.630872 0.045073 0.016413 0.529153 0.720651 0.534146
1.0000
Random excursions (8)
n/a
n/a
0.720551 0.559315
n/a
0.507115
n/a
0.421557
0.9927
Random excursions variant (18)
n/a
n/a
0.482817 0.425737
n/a
0.537126
n/a
0.225245
0.9943
Serial-1
0.000000 0.888561 0.464811 0.041445 0.983962 0.448933 0.342303 0.637119
0.9800
0.000000 0.584569 0.214004 0.311381 0.882605 0.545856 0.189946 0.616305
1.0000
Serial-2
Linear complexity
0.381449 0.968967 0.956401 0.767418 0.835116 0.327585 0.011104 0.171867
1.0000
The additive scrambling and exhaustive test was performed at varying light intensity from extreme dark to normal sunlight.
The minimum pass rate for each statistical test with the exception of the random excursion and random excursion variant test is 96 for 100 binary
The minimum pass rate for the random excursion and random excursion variant test is 65 for 69 binary sequences.

3.4.2

Result
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
sequences.

Data rate results

The data rate for random bit generation was calculated using the tick count of
in built SysTick Timer of the microcontroller. We calculated the delay of the
random bit generation algorithm for 100k samples, each one of 128 random
bit. The speculated random bit generation rate is plotted in figure 3.7 for
all sample values. The average random bit generation rate for the proposed
TRNG is 8 kbps, which is higher than the current maximum reported (250
bps) in[71] among sensor-based TRNG, to the best of our knowledge.

3.5

Summary

The proposed TRNG has a simple electronic hardware and software framework that is suitable for integration in existing photoresistor based IoT node.
The Ex-OR operation of the row sensor signal and LFSR is a novel method
that helps to achieve high entropy (≈1) and pass all mandatory NIST STS
tests to examine randomness. Additionally, this method helps to achieve a
faster random bit generation rate. The proposed photoresistor based TRNG
works satisfactorily at light conditions varying from extreme dark to normal
sunlight and can tolerate random changes in light intensity. To the best of our
knowledge, the average random bit generation rate of 8 kbps of the proposed
prototype is better in current sensor based TRNG research. The proposed
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Figure 3.7: Random bit generation rate for proposed TRNG (© 2020 IEEE).
TRNG can be used in IoT cryptographic operations such as key generation
in symmetric and asymmetric encryption, creation of Digital signature, and
random vector in a stream cipher.
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Chapter 4
Integrated TRNG-PUF
Architecture based on PV
Solar Cells for IoT
True Random Number Generator (TRNG) and Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) are inherently different architecture in a way they are designed.
Unifying them as one architecture can be advantageous for computing power,
memory and space limited smart computing devices.
The research work presented in this chapter was previously published in
[52] as A. Degada and H. Thapliyal, “An integrated trng-puf architecture
based on photovoltaic solar cells,” IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine,
vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 99-105, © 2021 IEEE.

4.1

Introduction

The IoT integrates sensors, computing platforms, and networking among
constituent blocks. The application space of IoT includes many intelligent
consumer electronics appliances such as in aerospace, smart-home, vehicles,
manufacturing plants, healthcare, real-time traffic monitoring, chemical process control, environmental monitoring, and smart-grid [128] [129], [130]. The
inherently decentralized framework is a blend using networking technology
and subsequently provides many vulnerable points to compromise security.
Therefore, it is challenging to ensure confidentiality, integrity, authenticity,
and availability across different physically integrated devices [27].
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Figure 4.1: Building security primitives from solar cell sensors (© 2020
IEEE).
The use of renewable energy sources to fulfill energy requirements is a
convenient way in the decentralized framework of IoT. The solar panels,
as shown in Figure 4.1, are preferred to supply the energy need in many
embedded apparatus in IoT. The Photovoltaic (PV) solar cell panels are
preferred way to harvest solar energy in IoT and thereby, PV solar sensors
find commonplace in many IoT applications[48]. Therefore, designing TRNG
and PUF using sensors (in our case PV solar cell sensor) and microcontrollerbased computing platform is a novel research direction.
The integration of TRNG and PUF as integrated architecture is a challenging task because of the fundamental difference of the PUF and TRNG
design. There are existing works that have demonstrated the integrated
TRNG-PUF architecture based on Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
[131] and CMOS [8], [132]. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is
no existing work on integrated TRNG-PUF design based on Photovoltaic
(PV) solar cells. Therefore, this article proposes integrated TRNG-PUF architecture devised around a common entropy source of Photovoltaic (PV)
solar cells. Further, the proposed architecture does not require additional
hardware and can be ported across the existing framework.
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Figure 4.2: Schematic of integrated TRNG-PUF architecture (© 2020
IEEE).

4.2

Integrated TRNG-PUF Architecture

The proposed prototype shown in Figure 4.2 operates in two modes: (i)
Training, and (ii) Run.
 The training mode learns the entropic nature of PV solar cells. The
mean value (µ) and Standard Deviation (SD) (σ) of each solar cell voltage histogram is recorded. Additionally, the training mode sets an optimal sampling interval, a vital step to set optimum TRNG throughput.
The detailed explanations are presented in the subsequent sections.
 The run mode segregates sensor response in either dynamic (large variation) response to produce TRNG output or static (stable) response to
generate PUF output. The prototype has an option to enter in training mode before producing each TRNG/PUF response. The updated
training information can reflect the change in response due to light
intensity variations.

4.2.1

TRNG bits Generation

The TRNG transform randomness in entropic source to generate random
bits. The proposed prototype produces initial binary streams by comparing
the successive voltage samples produced outside one SD (σ) around mean
(µ) in voltage histogram. However, the natural random source has a high
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correlation between the successive samples, and post-processing becomes inevitable. There exist many techniques for post-processing, and among them,
Von Neumann (VN) is particularly useful for limited computing power and
small memory size. The proposed prototype implements the Iterative Von
Neumann (IVN) approach to reduce wastage of initial binary streams (≈
76%)[133] in a single Von Neumann block.

4.2.2

PUF bits Generation

Over the years, many researchers have attempted to design the PUF using
sensors. The electrical voltage of PV solar cells should have a predictable
relationship with environmental conditions, e.g. ambient light for PV solar
cells. Further, the response of many samples should settle to a static value.
Additionally, the algorithm chosen should require less computing power and
memory for IoT applications. One such algorithm is proposed in our earlier
works [134] and the proposed prototypes in this research adapt the same
method. The prototype produces a PUF response bit by calculating average
voltage over one standard deviation (σ) around the mean (µ). This approach
helps to reject outlier sample voltage response that typically arises naturally
and thereby calculates a more stable voltage response.

4.2.3

Electrical Schematic of proposed prototype

Figure 4.3 is one of the possible ways to implement the proposed architecture and it can be explained in three steps. In step 1, the Analog-to-Digital
Converter (ADC) samples eight PV solar cell sensors and converts voltage
value into an equivalent digital reading. The next step implements training
and run mode. In addition to that, CPU also implements an algorithm to
produce 128-bit PUF response and IVN technique to produce 128-true random bits. In step 3, the TRNG and PUF response bits can be communicated
further to perform cryptographic co-processor functions.

4.3

Entropy Extraction Logic

The PV solar cell is a p-n junction diode, and its output voltage depends on
several variables. These variables include manufacturing process variations
between sensors, the number of photons falling over the p-n junction, lifetime
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Figure 4.3: An example electrical schematic (© 2020 IEEE).
of electron-hole, doping of p and n-type material, area of the p-n junction
and mobility of the charge. As these variables are random, we hypothesize
that the photovoltaic solar cells could be a good entropic source.
A PV solar cell was connected to the ADC of the microcontroller. The
output of the ADC is processed for analysis. The experiment setup was
put under a light chamber that facilitates constant light source and isolation
from the external light source. Figure 4.4 shows the histogram plot for the
PV solar cell sensor for a total of 100,000 samples. The sensor follows the
normal distribution. Important observations from Figure 4.4 are summarized
as follow:
 The PV solar cell follows near-normal distribution for sampled voltages.
 The voltage samples within one SD (σ) around mean (µ) value can be
utilized to calculate the average value, that would be relatively more
stable. Later, it can be useful to calculate PUF response bits as per
algorithm in [134].
 The successive voltage samples other than one SD (σ) around mean
(µ) value would be useful to generate raw binary bits.
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Figure 4.4: PV solar cell sensor voltage histogram (© 2020 IEEE).

4.4

Iterative Von Neumann (IVN) Processing for TRNG

A practical entropic source produces random bits 1 and 0 with unequal probability p and q respectively with some bias n. The number of unbiased bits
is equal to npq and is far less than the achievable entropy bound. The bias
makes the extraction of TRNG bits very difficult and depends upon sampling interval between two samples and environmental factors, such as external lighting, temperature, or humidity. The following equation originally
described in [133] is used to calculate the bias:
|p − q|
× 100%
(4.1)
2
The bias among initially generated raw bits arises due to a higher correlation between successive samples. High bias leads to rejection of raw bits,
and therefore an optimum bias is desirable. The bias value 10% is a good
balance between throughput and Shannon entropy per bit[133]. The Algon=

58

Algorithm 2 Input bit stream bias adjustment (© 2020 IEEE).
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:

procedure Bias-Adjust(bits, S, δ)
bits[ ] ← Array of initial bits
S ← Set initial sampling Interval
η ← Bias Value
δ ← Set step value
while η 6= 10% do
Generate 1000 sample bits in bits[ ]
Calculate bias η
if η >10% then
S =S−δ
else if η <10% then
S =S+δ

rithm 1 is part of the training mode. It sets the bias value equals to 10% by
adjusting sample interval (time difference between two successive samples).
The process begins with generating 1000 raw bits and calculating the bias.
Then, bias value is checked if it is >10% then subtract step value δ else add
step value δ in initial step interval.
After setting the bias value 10%, the prototype switches to run mode to
generate true random bits[133]. The initial input raw bit sequence is fed to
the IVN tree structure realized using 7 Von Neumann blocks illustrated in
Figure 4.6. The Von Neumann debiasing, shown in Figure 5a, is a suitable
technique for low-computing-power and low-memory devices due to its simpler operation. It rejects successive occurrence of bit sequence ”11” or ”00”
in output Von Neumann sequence and accepts bit sequence ”01” and ”10”
as a bit ’0’ and ’1’ respectively. However, a single Von Neumann can extract
throughput only up to 24%, a substantial loss of the bits.
Therefore, it becomes important to process entropy present in discarded
bits. As implied in the name IVN, we process the Ex-OR and residual sequence to extract entropy present in them. We made some design choices to
accommodate prototype for computing resource constraint platforms. First,
we limit the structure up to 7 VN blocks as additional VN blocks would not
result in much throughput improvement. Second, the residual sequence is
processed only at two blocks, where the bias in residual sequences is relatively higher. The final TRNG outcome is produced by concatenating the
output from all Von Neumann sequences and has ≈ 33.69% better through59

Figure 4.5: Von Neumann block and corresponding waveforms of output
sequences (© 2020 IEEE).
put than a single Von Neumann.

4.5

Performance Testing

The TRNG and PUF are inherently orthogonal in operation, therefore, the
metrics to measure the performance characteristic are quite different. Further, the change in light intensity can alter the electrical parameters of the
photovoltaic solar cell. Thus, the change in light intensity is a useful environmental condition to vary to test the performance. An ideal design should
work well at every light intensity. The experimental set up was placed inside a light chamber that facilitates the change in light condition from light
intensity 0 W/m2 (extreme dark) to 90 W/m2 (very bright sunlight).

4.5.1

PUF Performance Testing

The reliability and uniformity metrics are used to measure the performance
of the proposed PUF prototype. The PV solar sensors and microcontroller
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Figure 4.6: IVN tree structure using Von Neumann blocks. The value at
output sequence is throughput with respect to reference value 1 (input bit
sequence) and corresponding value in bracket indicates bias in percentage
(© 2020 IEEE).
set up were put inside the light chamber and PUF output bits were recorded
in PC.
Reliability
The reliability metric is the measure of the deviation of the PUF bit response
with the reference response. It uses the hamming distance and is a measure of
the reproducibility of PUF response with reference response. The following
equation was first used to calculate reliability, R of n-bit PUF response
M
1 X HD (Rref , Rm,t )
× 100%
R = 100% −
M m=1
n

(4.2)

The light intensity at 50 W/m2 (corresponding to normal room light
intensity) was considered as the reference point. The Hamming Distance
(HD) measures that how many bits are different between reference response,
Rref , and response generated at different light conditions Rm,t . Figure 4.7
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Figure 4.7: Reliability and Uniformity as a measure of PUF performance
metric (© 2020 IEEE).
shows the measured reliability at a different light intensity. The proposed
design has worst-case reliability of 92.13% at light intensity 90 W/m2 and
average reliability of 92.13% for light intensity variation from 50 W/m2 to at
90 W/m2 .
Uniformity
The uniformity measures the proportion of 0 and 1 in PUF response. The
ideal PUF response should have 50% uniformity, i.e. in 128-bit PUF response,
the number of 0-bits and 1-bits should be 64.
The light intensity 50 W/m2 was considered as reference and 12 different
readings were taken at an interval of 1 hour. The worst-case uniformity is
47.66% and the best case uniformity is 50%. The average uniformity was
measured at 50.91%, i.e. very close to the ideal value.

4.5.2

TRNG Performance Testing

The ideal TRNG should work independently of ambient light conditions. The
quality of a random number is measured by different tests, e.g. NIST STS,
DieHard, AIS, and TestU01. Among, them NIST STS is most widely used
by researchers [44], [8], thus we preferred it in our work. The NIST STS is a
collection of 15 tests that a true random sequence should satisfy.
The different tests in NIST STS check the number of occurrences of bits
1 and 0, find the run length, i.e. the number of consecutive occurrences of bit
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1 or zero, checking linear dependence among the sub-string of, periodicity
of occurrence in given length and ability to compress the sequence. Each
test is measured by calculating ”p-value”, which indicates the confidence of
randomness. A test with a p-value of > 0.01 indicates the test is passed
and with 99% confidence. The nature of each random test is different and
hence, the criteria for each test are also different. We collected a total of
100 random number sequences, where each sequence consists of 1 million
random bits with light varied at the random interval to simulate the realworld scenario. Further, we exposed some sensors to light and some sensors
were blocked during the data collection procedure. The minimum pass rate
for each test other than random excursion and random excursion variant is 96
out of 100. The criteria to pass the random excursion and random excursion
variant test are 65 out of 69 random bit sequences.
Table 4.1: NIST STS for TRNG evaluation. Result is ’pass’, if p-value >
0.01 (© 2020 IEEE).
Exhaustive Test

Test name
Frequency
Block frequency
Cumulative sums (forward)
Cumulative sums (reverse)
Runs
Longest run
Rank
FFT
Non-overlapping template (148)
Overlapping template
Universal
Approximate entropy
Random excursions (8)
Random excursions variant (18)
Serial-1
Serial-2
Linear complexity

p-value

Proportion

Result

0.845629
0.451279
0.152695
0.847926
0.562478
0.384567
0.747956
0.859674
0.501324
0.569541
0.659841
0.356947
0.846259
0.395846
0.756185
0.869416
0.231567

0.9900
1.0000
0.9900
0.9900
1.0000
0.9900
1.0000
1.0000
0.9937
0.9800
0.9900
1.0000
0.9927
0.9943
0.9900
1.0000
1.0000

Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass

Table 4.1 lists the results of each NIST test in terms of the p-value, the
proportion of the test passed and the result of the test as either pass/fail.
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The number in the bracket next to each test denotes, number of sub-tests.
The proportion simply indicates how many random sequences passed for the
test, with 1 indicating all 100 or 69 random bit sequences have cleared the
test. The proposed prototype passes all tests with a very high p-value, with
the lowest 0.231567 and the highest 0.845629. The average p-value for all
the tests is 0.45.

4.6

Summary

The research work in this article proposes an integrated design of TRNG and
PUF using PV solar cells and the microcontroller. We have shown that the
voltage response of PV solar cells can be engineered in static (stable) and
dynamic (large variation) response. The segregation is based on dividing the
PV solar cell histogram within or outside one SD (σ) around the mean voltage
value (µ). The proposed prototype uses Iterative Von Neumann (IVN) structure which has ≈ 33.69% better throughput to generate true random bits.
The proposed prototype achieves an average 92.13% reliability and 50.91%
uniformity in PUF response. The integrated TRNG-PUF architecture can
be beneficial in space-limited IoT.

64

Chapter 5
2-Phase Symmetric Pass Gate
Adiabatic Logic (2-SPGAL) to
design secure and
energy-efficient cryptographic
circuits
In recent years, researchers have shown that it is relatively simple to extract
the secret encryption key using Side-Channel Attack. On the other hand,
the healthcare sector is a lucrative target for the attacker as the data present
in the system has huge value, and the networking of many smart devices
provides multiple entry doors. In this research, we use the energy-recycling
principle that allows building Correlation Power Analysis (a type of SideChannel Attack) with a significant saving of the energy consumption.
The research work presented in this chapter was previously presented
in [10] as A. Degada and H. Thapliyal, “2-spgal: 2-phase symmetric pass
gate adiabatic logic for energy-efficient secure consumer iot,” in 2021 IEEE
International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE), pp. 1-6, © 2021
IEEE and currently under review in [53] as A. Degada and H. Thapliyal, “2phase adiabatic logic for low-energy and cpa-resistant implantable medical
devices,” IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics, pp. 1-10, 2021.
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5.1

Motivation

According to the World Health Organization report, 1.9 billion adults were
overweight, and out of which 35% were obese in 2017. Further, 340 million children and adolescents were obese or overweight in 2020. Higher body
weight can lead to chronic diseases, such as cardiovascular diseases, hypertension, diabetes, degenerative to joints, musculoskeletal system disorders, and
several cancers, e.g., liver, colon, ovarian, gallbladder, kidney, breast, and
prostate [135]. The US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) classify obesity
at epidemic proportions. The CDC reports say 6 in 10 adults in the US have
a chronic disease and 4 in 10 adults suffers more than one chronic disease
[136]. On the other end, the advancement in semiconductor technology has
empowered the inclusion of medical devices in many chronic disease diagnostic, therapeutic processes, and patient monitoring. They are pervasive
in medical labs, offices of physicians, and even implanted inside a patient’s
body, e.g. pacemaker, Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators (ICDs), and neurostimulators. Table 5.1 lists some of the medical devices and their frequency
range of the operation.
Table 5.1: Frequency range in medical applications.
Reference

Medical Application

[137]

Low frequency inductive
implants (pacemakers, ICD etc.)
[138] [139]
Implant communication
[140]
Bioelectrical impedance meter
[141]
Electrical Impedance Myography (EIM)
[142] [143] [144] Electrical Impedance Tomography (EIT)
[145]
CMOS wearable non-invasive
impedance meter
[146]
Hearing Aid
[147]
Magnetic Particle Imaging
(MPI) systems
[148] [149]
Low data-rate Body
Couple communication (BCC)
[150]
Home Health Hub

Frequency range
of operation
Less than 200 kHz
9 - 315kHz
50 kHz, 250 kHz
50 kHz
50 kHz to 250 kHz
100 Hz to 1 MHz
32 khz to 8.00 Mhz
1 kHz to 100 kHz
10 kHz to 10 MHz
200 kHz to 1.0 MHz

Modern medical devices often aggregate physiological data, store the personal information of the patient and communicate to the cloud. Some of these
66

devices, e.g. medical implants are battery-powered and their operational life
is limited up to 10 years [151] [152]. Over the years, many researchers have
raised concerns about compromising sensitive personal and physiological information. The compromised device can perform unauthorized command
execution and data transmission [40], create electrical shocks [42] [43] and
deplete battery [41]. It can compromise the secrecy and privacy of the patient
information, however, in some cases it could be life-threatening. It becomes
of utmost importance to protect user-information by including cryptographic
coprocessors in device design. Security often comes with the cost of increment
in the power consumption [153] [33] [154] [155]. Therefore, designing energyefficient and secure cryptographic coprocessor circuits in medical devices is
an interesting research direction.
Lightweight Cryptographic (LWC) cipher is one of the preferred solution
to provide encryption at low-energy budgets [156], [157], [158]. However,
in recent years, the LWC ciphers have been found vulnerable against SideChannel Analysis (SCA) attacks, e.g. heat emission, electromagnetic radiation, power analysis [101], [91], and timing attacks [99]. The work in [148]
[159] lists several possible SCA over medical devices. Among different possible SCA, the Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack is easy to implement
and found more lethal to reveal the encryption key.

Figure 5.1: Adiabatic Logic as preferred choice to design energy-efficient and
secure cryptographic coprocessor.
In this article, we use adiabatic logic to design energy-efficient and secure lightweight cryptographic coprocessor in medical devices (Figure 5.1).
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The adiabatic logic circuits recover the energy stored inside the load capacitor (rather than dissipating as heat), thus, results in significantly low-power
consumption. Further, the power traces of the adiabatic logic circuits are
uniform in shape, unlike the conventional CMOS logic circuits. The uniform power traces is a very important property to disguise the processed
information. The above property helps to combat the CPA.
The adiabatic logic is a low-power circuit design technique that recovers
the charge stored inside the load capacitors, and thus reduces the significant
energy consumption compared to the conventional CMOS logic. The physiological signals of human bodies are typically low-frequency values [160], [161],
[138]. Conventional ultra-low-power medical devices and operate over tens
to a few hundred kilohertz of the frequency range. As adiabatic logic operates energy efficiently at low frequency, therefore in this work, we proposed
to design low-energy and secure cryptographic co-processors based on adiabatic logic. Further, the adiabatic logic circuits have uniform power traces,
thereby ”hides” the information leakages. Therefore, the proposed LWC circuit based on adiabatic logic will be resilient against the CPA attacks. To
validate our hypothesis, we present a novel 2-phase Symmetric Pass Gate
Adiabatic Logic (2-SPGAL) and use it to design a low-energy and CPA resistant design of LWC PRESENT. The energy and CPA resilient capability
of the adiabatic logic circuit largely depends upon the design of the power
clock generator (PCG) [162], [163], [164], [165]. The PCG consumes a large
fraction of the energy consumption, and its poor design can also affect security resilience. In this work, we evaluate the energy and security metrics of
the proposed 2-SPGAL with two different synchronous resonant sinusoidal
PCGs: 2N2P-PCG and 2N-PCG (Refer Section 2.5).

5.1.1

Key Contributions from this work

The key contributions of this work are as follows:
 The chapter presents 2-SPGAL, a novel 2-phase sinusoidal clocking
implementation of Symmetric Pass Gate Adiabatic Logic (SPGAL).
The proposed 2-SPGAL can be a design choice for low-energy and
CPA-resistant IMDs.
 The energy and security of the adiabatic logic largely depend upon the
PCG integrated into the design. Therefore, we evaluated the energy
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efficiency and CPA-resistance of the proposed 2-SPGAL with two different types of synchronous resonant Power Clock Generators (PCGs).
Two types of PCGs are 2N2P-PCG and 2N-PCGs.
 The logic gates, AND/NAND and XOR/XNOR gates of 2-SPGAL are
evaluated in terms of energy and security metrics with 2N2P-PCG and
2N-PCG integrated into the design.
 The one round of PRESENT-80 designed using proposed 2-SPGAL
with 2N-PCG integrated into the design, shows an average of 47.50%
energy saving compared to its CMOS counterpart design for the frequency range of 50 kHz to 250 kHz. The same design implemented
with 2N2P-PCG integrated into the design shows an average of 51.18%
energy saving compared to its CMOS counterpart over the frequency
range of 50 kHz to 250 kHz.
 The one round of PRESENT-80 designed using 2-SPGAL with 2N2PPCG integrated into design shows an average of 16.62% energy-saving
compared to existing 2-phase adiabatic logic 2-EE-SPFAL [9]. Similarly, 2N-PCG integrated into the design shows an average energy saving of approximately 29% compared to 2-EE-SPFAL [9].
 The output of the PRESENT-80 S-box is considered as the attack point
in literature. Its CPA resilience capability is measured in Normalized
Energy Deviation (NED) and Normalized Standard Deviation (NSD)
metrics. The 2-SPGAL based S-box with 2N-PCG integrated shows
an average improvement of 97.60% security performance improvement
compared to CMOS counterpart over the frequency range of 50 kHz
to 250 kHz. . Similarly, the 2-SPGAL based S-box with 2N2P-PCG
integrated into design shows an average of 96.61% security performance
improvement. Further, 2-SPGAL based S-box design has an average of
11.56% better security performance compared to its 2-EE-SPFAL [9]
counterpart.
 We demonstrate that the PRESENT-80 using novel 2-SPGAL can successfully defend the encryption key against the CPA attack for both
2N2P-PCG and 2N-PCG integrated with the design. However, the encryption key is revealed in the same counterpart design using CMOS.
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5.2

Proposed 2-Phase Adiabatic Logic Design

Figure 5.2: General SPGAL logic gate structure[6] (© 2021 IEEE).

Figure 5.3: Sinusoidal clocking idea [9], [10] (© 2021 IEEE).
The Symmetric Pass Gate Adiabatic Logic (SPGAL) logic gate structure
(Figure 5.2) consists of three blocks: a sense amplifier, a discharge circuitry,
and logic evaluation blocks. The PMOS transistors M1, and M2 construct
the sense amplifier/latch. The discharge signal turns the nmos transistor M3,
and M4 to ON, and provides a discharge patch for residue charge stored in the
load capacitor. The evaluation block transistors produce correct logic gate
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Figure 5.4: Four cascaded adiabatic buffers implemented in cascade using
2-phase clocking scheme [9], [10] (© 2021 IEEE).
output based on input logic signals. The SPGAL was originally proposed on
a 4-Phase trapezoidal clocking scheme [6].
In this work, we hypothesize that the slow varying sinusoidal signal (Figure 5.3) can be a potential replacement for the trapezoidal clock. To check
our hypothesis, the discharge signal is adjusted to the negative peak of the
sinusoidal signal. The rising part of the sinusoidal signal is referred to as
evaluate and the falling part is referred to as the recovery phase of the adiabatic operations. The two discharge signals are synchronous to the negative
pick of the respective phase. The above 2-phase sinusoidal clocking implementation of SPGAL is referred to as 2-SPGAL. The adiabatic logic circuits
operate in pipelined fashions. It was found (Figure 5.4) that the 2-phase
sinusoidal clocking allows using two out-of-phase power clocks and discharge
signals to operate a 4-cascaded 2-SPGAL buffer logic gate.

5.3

Energy and security evaluation of 2-SPGAL
logic gates

The next step is to check the energy and security evaluation of 2-SPGAL
gates at different frequencies with PCG integrated into the design. For an
ideal secure circuit, the variation in energy consumption should be zero for all
possible input variations. In a practical scenario, the lower variation in energy
consumption comes from a smaller variation in current traces. Further, the
CPA estimates the correlation between the leakage power and mathematical
hypothetical power models. Hence, the success of CPA depends upon the
linear dependency between the hypothetical power traces and collected power
traces. The above linear dependency can be disguised if we have uniform
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Figure 5.5: Uniform current in 2-SPGAL Ex-OR logic gate (© 2021 IEEE).
current traces. Figure 5.5 shows the current traces for XOR gates as an
example. It can be observed that current traces 2-SPGAL based logic gates
are uniform.
We performed the SPICE simulation to collect the energy consumption
value for all possible input bit variations. For example, an n-bit circuit will
have a total 22n possible cyclic variations. The NED and NSD metrics at
different frequencies can give an idea about the security resilience of the 2SPGAL gates against CPA attack. The smaller the NED and NSD values
imply the more robustness against the CPA attack. They are calculated
based on energy consumption in circuit for different input bit combinations.
On the other hand, the energy and security evaluation of the adiabatic logic
circuit largely depends upon the types of PCG integrated. Thereby, the
energy and security metric of the logic gates should be compared with PCG
integrated into the design.
Table 6.1 lists the simulation results for the proposed 2-SPGAL and the
existing 2-EE-SPFAL [9] AND/NAND logic gate with 2N2P-PCG and 2NPCG integrated into the design. Among the four different designed listed in
Table 6.1, 2-SPGAL AND/NAND logic gate with 2N-PCG integrated into
the design has superior performance. It has an average NED and NSD value
of 1.669 and 0.518 respectively over the frequency range of 50 kHz to 250 kHz.
The 2-SPGAL AND/NAND logic gate with 2N2P-PCG integrated into the
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Figure 5.6: NED value comparison for AND logic gate.

Figure 5.7: NSD value comparison for AND logic gate.
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design, has an average NED and NSD metric value of 2.043 and 0.607. The
average NED and NSD values for 2-EE-SPFAL [9] AND/NAND logic gate
with 2N2P-PCG integrated into the design are 2.055 and 0.604 respectively,
over the frequency range of 50 kHz to 250 kHz. The 2-SPGAL AND/NAND
logic gate has identical CPA resilience capability with 2N2P-PCG integrated
into the design compared to the 2-EE-SPFAL [9] counterpart. Further, the
2-SPGAL AND logic gate shows superior CPA resilience capability for 2NPCG integrated into the design compared to 2-EE-SPFAL [9] AND/NAND
logic gate counterpart.
Table 5.2: Energy-efficiency and security evaluation of the 2-phase AND logic
gate with 2N-PCG and 2N2P-PCG.
Proposed 2-SPGAL AND Logic Gate
50 kHz

100 kHz

125 kHz

250 kHz

PCG

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

E min (f J)
E max (f J)
E avg (f J)
NED (%)
NSD (%)

9.18
9.30
9.24
1.300
0.402

11.25
11.49
11.40
2.050
0.596

11.15
11.38
11.29
2.008
0.583

9.00
9.15
9.09
1.629
0.548

11.11
11.37
11.28
2.246
0.667

9.00
9.13
9.08
1.461
0.459

11.16
11.46
11.35
2.616
0.776

8.97
9.11
9.05
1.534
0.467

2-EE-SPFAL AND Logic Gate [9]
50 kHz

100 kHz

125 kHz

250 kHz

PCG

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

E min (f J)
E max (f J)
E avg (f J)
NED (%)
NSD (%)

11.86
12.10
12.02
2.052
0.603

7.40
7.65
7.50
3.258
1.064

11.75
11.98
11.89
1.862
0.571

5.18
5.32
5.26
2.558
0.766

11.70
11.94
11.86
2.073
0.589

5.40
5.54
5.48
2.497
0.798

11.76
12.03
11.94
2.231
0.652

6.28
6.43
6.37
2.211
0.769

Similar to AND/NAND logic gate, we performed the simulation to collect
energy numbers for the proposed 2-SPGAL XOR logic gate and 2-EE-SPFAL
[9] XOR/XNOR logic gate with 2N2P-PCG, and 2N-PCG integrated into
the design. Table 5.3 shows energy and security metrics comparison for
proposed 2-SPGAL XOR/XNOR gate with 2-EE-SPFAL XOR/XNOR logic
gate [9]. The 2-SPGAL XOR/XNOR logic gate has an average NED and
NSD values almost equal to zero like its 2-EE-SPFAL [9] counterpart with
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Figure 5.8: NED value comparison for XOR logic gate.
PCGs integrated into the design. This property is accounted for the balance
of inputs on logic evaluation blocks. This results in a more symmetrically
built load capacitance value. It results in equal switching activities of the
XOR gate, thereby, more uniform power traces, therefore, almost ideal NED
and NSD metric values.

Figure 5.9: NSD value comparison for XOR logic gate.
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Table 5.3: Energy-efficiency and security evaluation of 2-phase XOR logic
gate with 2N-PCG and 2N2P-PCG.
2-SPGAL XOR Logic Gate
50 kHz
PCG

2N2P

E min (f J) 11.10
E max (f J) 11.11
E avg (f J) 11.10
NED (%) 0.0044
NSD (%) 0.0022

100 kHz

125 kHz

250 kHz

2N

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

9.04
9.04
9.04
0.0042
0.0021

11.02
11.02
11.02
0.004
0.002

8.87
8.87
8.87
0.006
0.0036

10.99
10.99
10.99
0.006
0.003

8.89
8.89
8.89
0.008
0.004

11.06
11.06
11.06
0.007
0.004

8.87
8.87
8.87
0.011
0.005

2-EE-SPFAL XOR Logic Gate [9]
50 kHz
PCG

2N2P

E min (f J) 11.71
E max (f J) 11.71
E avg (f J) 11.71
NED (%) 0.0028
NSD (%) 0.0014

100 kHz

125 kHz

250 kHz

2N

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

7.62
7.62
7.62
0.0001
0.0000

11.58
11.58
11.58
0.004
0.002

5.19
5.19
5.19
0.023
0.0012

11.56
11.57
11.56
0.005
0.003

5.36
5.37
5.36
0.023
0.011

11.63
11.63
11.63
0.006
0.003

6.19
6.19
6.19
0.019
0.009
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5.4

Case study - PRESENT-80 one round of
encryption design using 2-SPGAL

In this section, we illustrate the design of the PRESENT, a lightweight cryptographic cipher. The PRESENT is a simple, secure, and energy-efficient
block cipher. The PRESENT block cipher is particularly suitable to the
application which does not require large data to be encrypted, e.g. IMDs,
RFID, IoT. The proposed 2-SPGAL can be a potential logic design option
to design energy-efficient and secure IMDs.

5.4.1

PRESENT-80 implementation using proposed 2SPGAL

The cryptographic circuits of the IMD should be low-energy as they operate
in a limited battery budget. The PRESENT was originally proposed in
[5] and recently received higher attention from the researchers due to its
ability to meet low-energy encryption. Further, the counter mode operation
of PRESENT enables its usage in challenge-response authentication protocols
[166]. The PRESENT-80 comes up with two variants depending upon the size
of the key, 80-bit, and 120-bit. The PRESENT-80 is 32-round of encryption,
and out of which 31 rounds are identical. Therefore, we implemented one
round of PRESENT-80 encryption using the proposed 2-SPGAL.

Figure 5.10: one round of PRESENT-80 implementation using 2-phase adiabatic logic (© 2021 IEEE).
Figure 6.8 shows the schematic of the case-study design of PRESENT-80
one round of encryption. The PRESENT-80 design has three fundamental
operations. During addRoundKey operation the XOR operation of the plaintext is done with the key. The Substitution-box (S-box) does the non-linear
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transformation in 4-bit chunks, with a total of 16 in parallel. The third operation is the permutation of the S-box output to add further randomization
[5].
Table 5.4: Number of Transistor Required to implement PRESENT-80 one
round [10] (© 2021 IEEE).
Adiabatic Logic

2-EE-SPFAL [9]

Proposed 2-SPGAL

9344

7776

Number of Transistor

2-SPGAL saves 16.78% transistor to its counterpart 2-EE-SPFAL [9]
Table 5.4 lists the total number of transistors required to implement using
proposed 2-SPGAL and 2-EE-SPFAL [9]. The SPGAL has two fewer transistors in its sense-amplifier structure of the gate. The 2-SPGAL based design
requires 7776 transistors, while its counterpart designed using 2-EE-SPFAL
needs 9344 transistors. This results in 16.78% fewer transistors in 2-SPGAL
design compared to 2-EE-SPFAL [9]. The less number of transistors and
simpler power clock routing can result meet the smaller layout and are the
requirement for consumer IoT devices.

5.4.2

Energy-Efficiency comparison
T

Z
E=

VP IP dt

(5.1)

0

The energy consumption is the integration of the voltage and current
product over the time period of the input signal. The Vp is voltage and Ip
is the current from PCG or power supply [167]. We show the comparison of
the average energy consumption for the one round of PRESENT-80 at 45nm
technology with 10 fF load using (i) Proposed 2-SPGAL with 2N-PCG, and
(ii) Proposed 2-SPGAL with 2N2P-PCG, (iii) 2-EE-SPFAL [9] with 2N-PCG,
(iv) 2-EE-SPFAL [9] with 2N2P-PCG and (iv) conventional CMOS design.
The cryptographic circuits are presented for low-frequency IMD devices, and
therefore the frequency range of 50 kHz to 250 kHz is considered in this work.
The energy consumption is measured in terms of energy per cycle, i.e.
average energy consumption value over all possible combinations of inputs
[9]. Lower the energy per cycle value means better energy performance,
and thus can be useful to design energy-saving IMDs. The energy per cycle
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Table 5.5: Energy consumption (in pJ/cycle) in case study of one round of
PRESENT-80 encryption.
Logic used to
design case study

PCG integrated
in design

50 kHz

100 kHz

125 kHz

250 kHz

Average

CMOS

–

2.376

1.569

1.409

1.092

1.611

2-EE-SPFAL [9]

2N-PCG
2N2P-PCG

1.250
0.848

1.257
0.895

1.066
0.870

0.913
0.878

1.121
0.872

Proposed 2-SPGAL

2N-PCG
2N2P-PCG

0.795
0.725

0.795
0.728

0.787
0728

0.764
0.728

0.785
0.727

Table 5.6: Energy saving (in %) comparison in proposed 2-SPGAL based one
round of PRESENT-80 encryption.
PCG integrated in Baseline Logic to compare
2-SPGAL design case study implementation

50 kHz

100 kHz

125 kHz

250 kHz

Average

2N-PCG

2-EE-SPFAL [9]
CMOS

36.40
66.54

36.76
49.32

26.13
44.10

16.32
30.05

28.90
47.50

2N2P-PCG

2-EE-SPFAL [9]
CMOS

14.47
69.49

18.66
53.39

16.31
48.31

17.02
33.31

16.62
51.18

for one round of PRESENT-80 designed using 2-SPGAL, 2-EE-SPFAL [9],
and CMOS is shown in Table 5.5. The proposed 2-SPGAL logic base one
round of PRESENT-80 shows overall superior performance compared to their
CMOS and 2-EE-SPFAL counterparts for every frequency in the range of 50
kHz to 250 kHz. The average energy consumption (i.e. average energy for
the frequency range 50 kHz to 250 kHz) for 2-SPGAL 0.727 pJ/Cycle and
0.785 pJ/Cycle respectively for 2N2P-PCG, and 2N-PCG integrated into the
design. The same counterpart designed using 2-EE-SPFAL has an average
energy consumption of 0.872 pJ/Cycle and 1.121 pJ/Cycle respectively with
2N2P-PCG, and 2N-PCG integrated into the design. Further, it can also be
observed that for 2N-PCG integrated into the design, the 2-SPGAL based
case study implementation has approximately 30% less average energy consumption (in pJ/Cycle) compared to its 2-EE-SPFAL counterpart. Thus,
for 2N-PCG integration into the design, the proposed 2-SPGAL can result
in more energy saving compared to 2-EE-SPFAL. On the other hand, the
CMOS-based one round of PRESENT-80 encryption design has an average
energy consumption of 1.611 pJ/Cycle, the highest among five different circuits compared.
Table 5.6 lists the energy-saving (in%) value in 2-SPGAL based one round
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of PRESENT-80 implementation compared to its CMOS and 2-EE-SPFAL
based counterpart designs. The energy-saving in 2-phase adiabatic logic are
compared for the same type of PCG integrated into the design. on the
other hand, the CMOS-based counterpart is implemented over DC voltage.
The proposed 2-SPGAL based counterpart shows an average of 16.62% and
28.90% of energy-saving respectively with 2N2P-PCG and 2N-PCG integrated into the design, compared to its 2-EE-SPFAL counterpart. Therefore,
the 2-SPGAL saves overall more energy compared to other 2-phase adiabatic
logic 2-EE-SPFAL [9]. Similarly, we can see an average of 47.50% and 51.18%
energy saving, with 2N-PCG and 2N2P-PCG integrated into 2-SPGAL design compared to CMOS based case-study implementation. Saving close to
50% of energy can help to increase IMD device lifetime substantially.

5.5

Energy and Security evaluation of PRESENT80 S-box design

In Section V, the 2-SPGAL based logic gates were shown promising results
for the NED, and NSD metrics. The CPA attack collects the power traces at
the output of the S-box, thereby it is a vital component of the PRESENT-80
design. We implemented the S-box design using the proposed 2-SPGAL, 2EE-SPFAL [9], and CMOS logic gates. The S-box implementation requires
both φ1 , and φ2 phases (Figure 6.8) of power clock to operate. The S-box
designs using adiabatic logic were tested for two PCGs: 2N-PCG and 2N2PPCG.
Table 5.7 shows the summary of energy consumption values and security
metrics (NED and NSD) for the 2-SPGAL and 2-EE-SPFAL [9] based S-box
with 2N2P-PCG and 2N-PCG integrated with the design. Similar to logic
gates, we collected energy numbers for all possible input combinations for
the frequency range 50 kHz to 250 kHz at 45nm technology with the load
value of 10 fF. It can be observed, in Table 5.7 that energy consumption in 2SPGAL with 2N-PCG integrated design shows superior energy consumption
value, with an average value of 48.49 fJ at all frequencies in consideration.
The next better energy consumption for S-box is observed for 2-SPGAL with
2N2P-PCG integrated with design with an average value of 80.18 fJ.
Figure 5.11 and 5.12 shows the comparison of NED and NSD value for
S-box designed using proposed 2-SPGAL, 2-EE-SPFAL [9], and CMOS logic.
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Table 5.7: Energy-efficiency and security evaluation of PRESENT-80 S-box
design using 2-phase adiabatic logic.
S-box design using 2-SPGAL logic gates
50 kHz

100 kHz

125 kHz

250 kHz

PCG

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

E min (f J)
E max (f J)
E avg (f J)
NED (%)
NSD (%)

80.08
84.09
81.48
4.78
0.96

50.69
52.57
51.38
3.59
0.74

78.38
84.51
80.04
7.25
1.18

47.64
49.67
48.42
4.08
0.89

78.18
83.00
79.82
5.81
1.19

46.94
49.04
47.78
4.27
0.92

77.65
82.49
79.39
5.86
1.20

45.45
47.64
46.41
4.60
0.98

S-box design using 2-EE-SPFAL logic gates [9]
50 kHz
PCG

2N2P

E min (f J) 111.87
E max (f J) 120.24
E avg (f J) 116.37
NED (%)
6.96
NSD (%)
1.28

100 kHz

125 kHz

250 kHz

2N

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

2N2P

2N

3654.23
3971.60
3898.30
7.99
1.45

106.79
114.36
110.34
6.62
1.31

1050.03
1183.61
1125.50
11.29
1.83

105.81
113.04
109.02
6.40
1.30

750.94
774.58
761.56
3.05
0.82

103.21
110.28
106.27
6.40
1.30

247.59
255.92
252.75
3.25
0.82

We can see that adiabatic logic-based S-box has comparatively very low NED,
and NSD value or better resilience against CPA compared to CMOS-based
S-box. The S-box design using proposed 2-SPGAL, with 2N-PCG integrated
into the design, shows an average of 95.86% and 99.34% better NED and NSD
metric performance respectively compared its CMOS counterpart over the
frequency range of 50 kHz to 250 kHz. Similarly, the 2-SPGAL S-box design
with 2N2P-PCG integrated into the design shows an average of 94.07% and
99.16% better NED and NSD metric values respectively compared to CMOS
counterpart over the frequency range of 50 kHz to 250 kHz. Further, the
2-SPGAL with 2N2P-PCG shows 10.15% and 12.98% better NED and NSD
values respectively compared to the same counterpart implemented using
2-EE-SPFAL [9].
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Figure 5.11: NED value comparison for PRESENT-80 S-box.

5.6

CPA Attack on one round of PRESENT80 encryption design

The energy efficiency and security metrics comparison show the efficacy of
the 2-SPGAL. It is also important to check the security resilience of the 2SPGAL based design against power analysis attacks. The Correlation Power
Analysis (CPA) is simpler to implement and has proven its success against
symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms. The procedure to perform
the CPA attack is explained in [168]. The one round of PRESENT-80 (Figure
6.8) is consist of 16 identical circuit blocks that includes four XOR gates and
an S-box. Therefore, performing CPA attack on one such block would be
similar to performing the CPA attack on entire circuit.
The CPA attack requires the power traces collected from the attack point.
The SPICE simulation was performed with a load value 10 fF to collect the
power traces. The simulation environment is noise-free and requires fewer
traces for successful CPA. More power traces are needed to minimize the noise
effect. The simulation environment collects 80 traces in one clock period. For
CMOS-based PRESENT-80 case-study design requires 5120 traces for successful CPA. Figure 6.14 shows that key-value 14 is revealed in PRESENT-80
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Figure 5.12: NSD value comparison for PRESENT-80 S-box.
designed using CMOS logic.
Similarly, we collected the 12,000 traces for PRESENT-80 implementation integrated with 2N-PCG and 2N-2P PCG. The larger number of traces
can make the probability of CPA success higher. More traces results in a
precise correlation between measured and hypothetical power traces used in
the CPA attack. Figure 5.14 and 5.15 show that the correlation coefficient
of actual key-value-14 is not standing out from other possible key values.
The uniform current in the proposed 2-SPGAL at sinusoidal clocking helps
to preserve the key. The CPA on case-study implementation shows that the
proposed 2-SPGAL is energy efficient and secure against CPA attack.

5.7

Summary

This chapter presented 2-SPGAL, the 2-phase sinusoidal clocking implementation of Symmetric Pass Gate Adiabatic Logic (SPGAL) for Implantable
Medical Devices (IMDs). The 2-SPGAL is energy-efficient and secure against
the Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack. The proposed 2-SPGAL was
evaluated in terms of energy, and security with two synchronous resonant
Power Clock Generators (PCGs): 2N-PCG, and 2N2P-PCG. The case-study
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Figure 5.13: Successful Revelation of Key=14 in on one round of PRESENT80 encryption designed with CMOS (© 2021 IEEE).
implementation of PRESENT-80 one round of encryption shows better energy saving compared to CMOS design for both 2N-PCG and 2N2P-PCG
integrated with the design. The CPA attack point S-box shows better NED,
and NSD as security metrics value in the proposed 2-SPGAL based design
(with 2N-PCG and 2N2P PCG integrated) compared to CMOS based design. We also demonstrated that 2-SPGAL based design can protect the secret key against CPA, however, the key gets successfully revealed in CMOS
based design. The proposed 2-SPGAL with its promising energy-efficient
and CPA-resistant properties can be used to design energy-efficient and secure Implantable Medical Devices.
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Figure 5.14: Unsuccessful CPA attack on one round of PRESENT-80 encryption designed with proposed 2-SPGAL and 2N-PCG.

Figure 5.15: Unsuccessful CPA attack on one round of PRESENT-80 encryption design with proposed 2-SPGAL and 2N2P-PCG.
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Chapter 6
2-Phase Single-Rail Clocked
CMOS Adiabatic Logic
(CCAL) to design secure and
energy-efficient cryptographic
circuits
In this work, we explore the single-rail adiabatic logic-based on 2-phase sinusoidal power clocking system. The single-rail adiabatic logic has similar logic
gate structure to its CMOS counterpart. Furthermore, the single-rail adiabatic logic based cryptographic circuit are CPA resilient (similar to 2-SPGAL
[53]) and reduce transistor count and saves significant energy.
The research work presented in this chapter is currently under review
in [54] as A. Degada and H. Thapliyal, “Single-rail adiabatic logic for energyefficient and cpa-resistant cryptographic circuit in low-frequency medical
devices,” IEEE Open Journal of Nanotechnology, pp. 1-13, 2021.

6.1

Introduction

In previous chapter, we proposed two-phase sinusoidal clocking based adiabatic logic 2-phase Energy Efficient Secure Positive Feedback Adiabatic Logic
(2-EE-SPFAL) [9] and 2-phase Symmetric Pass Gate Adiabatic Logic (2SPGAL) [10]. The above solution enables to the design of the low-energy
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and CPA secure circuit. The 2-EE-SPFAL and 2-SPGAL are classified as
dual-rail adiabatic logic as they produce two outputs at the logic gate, Vout
and Vout . The dual-rail adiabatic logic uses the two-transistor logic evaluation network to balance the switching activities, and therefore have uniform
power traces. The above feature results in a larger transistor count overhead.
Currently, CMOS-based computing technology is reaching to its limit in
energy efficiency with scaling down of the technology. There are two possible
directions to reduce the energy consumption: (i) to reduce the energy required to distinct the logic ’1’ from logic ’0’ (ii) conserve the energy from one
logical operation to the next [169] [170]. The adiabatic logic works on the
energy recovery principle and is classified under the second approach mentioned above. Adiabatic logic in bulk MOSFET has emerged as an attractive
choice for the designer compared to conventional CMOS due to its superior
energy performance and CPA resilience.
The adiabatic logic circuits recover the energy stored inside the load capacitor (rather than dissipating as heat), thus, results in significantly lowpower consumption. Further, the power traces of the adiabatic logic circuits
are uniform in shape, unlike the conventional CMOS logic circuits. The uniform power traces is a very important property to disguise the processed
information. The above property helps to combat the CPA. Earlier, we proposed two-phase sinusoidal clocking based adiabatic logic 2-phase Energy
Efficient Secure Positive Feedback Adiabatic Logic (2-EE-SPFAL) [9] and
2-phase Symmetric Pass Gate Adiabatic Logic (2-SPGAL) [10]. The above
solution enables the design of the low-energy and CPA secure circuit. The
2-EE-SPFAL and 2-SPGAL are classified as dual-rail adiabatic logic as they
produce two outputs at the logic gate, Vout and Vout . The dual-rail adiabatic
logic uses the two-transistor logic evaluation network to balance the switching activities, and therefore have uniform power traces. The above feature
results in a larger transistor count overhead.
In this research, we address the above issue by exploring the single-rail
adiabatic logic called Clocked CMOS Adiabatic Logic (CCAL). The CCAL
was previously proposed in [11] with preliminary analysis limited to reduction in energy consumption for logic gates and a chain of inverters. It is
interesting to see the security performance of the CCAL. Further, the energy and security performance of the adiabatic logic circuits largely depends
upon the Power-Clock Generator (PCG) integrated with the logic circuit.
The poor interfacing suffers a reduction in energy-saving and compromised
security (explained in Section II). In this article, we evaluate the energy
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efficiency and security performance of the CCAL logic to design a secure
cryptographic circuit with PCG integrated into the design. Further, the
physiological signals in human bodies are typically a few tens to hundreds of
the frequency range. In the digital domain, after sampling the operational
frequencies are mostly limited up to a few kHz (Table 5.1). The adiabatic
logic is saved significant energy consumption compared to its CMOS counterpart at low-frequency applications. Some example of the low-frequency
medical device includes inductive implants, bioimpedance meter, Electrical
Impedance Myography (EIM), hearing aids, Electrical Impedance Tomography (EIT), Magnetic Particle Imaging (MPI), and Body-Coupled Communication (BCC), etc. In this article, we evaluate the performance of the CCAL
based cryptographic circuit for the frequency range of 50 kHz to 250 kHz.

6.1.1

Key Contribution

The key contributions of this work are as follows:
 The article explores CCAL, a novel single-rail Clocked CMOS Adiabatic Logic (CCAL) to design energy-efficient and secure cryptographic
circuits. The CCAL can be an alternate choice for low-energy and
CPA-resistant medical devices.
 The case-study implementation of PRESENT-80 S-Box circuitry saves
more than 95% energy for frequency range 50 kHz to 125 kHz and
approximately 60% more energy saving at 250 kHz compared to its
CMOS counterpart. The above energy saving can be highly beneficial
to design low-power cryptographic circuits.
 The case-study implementation shows saving of 45.74% and 34.88% of
transistors compared to 2-EE-SPFAL [9] and 2-SPGAL [10]. At 250
kHz, compared to the dual-rail adiabatic designs of S-box based on 2EE-SPFAL and 2-SPGAL, the CCAL based S-box shows 32.67% and
11.21% of energy savings, respectively. Thus, CCAL can be an alternate choice to design a secure and energy-efficient cryptographic circuit
with lesser transistor overhead compared to its dual-rail adiabatic logic
counterpart.
 We also presents the effect of varying tank capacitance in 2N2P-PCG
over energy efficiency and security performance. We demonstrate that
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having 200 fF value of tank capacitor (CE ) in 2N2P-PCG can provide
optimum energy and security features.
 The single-rail CCAL based circuitry removes the need for discharge
circuitry required in its dual-rail counterpart. It helps to reduce the
external need for the control signals for discharge circuitry.
 We demonstrate that the PRESENT-80 using CCAL can successfully
defend the encryption key against the CPA attack for both 2N2P-PCG
integrated into the design. However, the encryption key is revealed in
the same counterpart design using CMOS.

6.2

Clocked CMOS Adiabatic Logic (CCAL)

In recent years, researchers have shown the effectiveness of power-analysis
attacks to reveal the encryption key in cryptographic circuits. There have
been many countermeasures are proposed, e.g., masking [91], random instruction injection [92], non-deterministic processors [93], random register
renaming [94], secure co-processors [95], and cell-level countermeasures [96].
In this work, we employ the cell-level countermeasure, i.e. to build secure
logic gates. Adiabatic logic design is one such approach, that can thwart the
power-analysis attacks such as CPA.
In this section, we briefly discuss the adiabatic logic and the common
metrics used to evaluate CPA resilience. Further, the energy and security
performance of adiabatic logic circuits largely depend on the Power-Clock
Generator (PCG) integrated into the design. We also provide a brief overview
of the type of the PCG integrated with design.

6.3

Evaluation in Energy-efficiency and Security Metrics performance evaluation of
the CCAL

In this section, we will first illustrate the background on the logic gate structure of CCAL. Then, we will present the energy efficiency and security performance evaluation of CCAL logic gates with 2N2P-PCG integrated into
the design.
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6.3.1

Background on CCAL

The Clocked CMOS Adiabatic Logic (CCAL) was previously proposed in
[11] with preliminary analysis limited to reduction in energy consumption
for logic gates and a chain of inverters. Figure 6.1 shows the generalized
gate structure of CCAL. It consists of two primary parts, (i) CMOS logic
(ii) clock connection which connects CMOS logic to the sinusoidal clocking
part. The signals V P C and V P C are two out-of-phase sinusoidal power
clocks. The operation of CCAL can be explained in two stages: (i) Evaluation
(E) (ii) Recovery (R). During the Evaluation stage, when the voltage at
both clock signals is more than the threshold voltage (Vth ) then it turns on
both transistor M1 and M2 (clock connection network). Then the PMOS
and NMOS blocks evaluate the output logic based on the input signal logic.
During the Recovery (R) phase, the output voltage stored in load capacitance
is held until the next evaluation phase.
There have been many low-energy solutions in the research literature that
works low-frequency operation. The adiabatic circuit-based cryptographic
circuits are found to defend encryption keys against power-analysis attacks.
Earlier, we proposed the two-phase sinusoidal clocking-based dual-rail adiabatic logic 2-SPGAL[10] and 2-EE-SPFAL [9]. The CCAL can be an alternate choice to design CPA secure and energy-efficient cryptographic circuits.
The single-rail adiabatic, e.g. CCAL has less logic overhead compared to
its dual-rail adiabatic logic counterpart. The above properties can be highly
beneficial for resource-constrained IMDs. Further, the dual-rail logic, 2-EESPFAL [9] and 2-SPGAL [10] requires the additional discharge circuitry and
corresponding control signals. The CCAL network removes the need for discharge circuitry and the logic gate structure is very similar to the CMOS
logic gate.
However, the performance of the adiabatic logic is largely affected by the
integration of the PCG. It is important to investigate the performance of
the CCAL based cryptographic circuits energy efficiency and security performance with the integration of PCG in design. Therefore, we evaluated the
performance of the CCAL based circuits with 2N2P-PCG integrated into the
design.
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Figure 6.1: Clocked CMOS Adiabatic Logic (CCAL) gate schematic [11].

6.3.2

Energy-efficiency and security evaluation of CCAL
logic gates

Logic gates are the primary constituent of a larger circuit. It becomes important to check the energy and security metrics performance to build lowenergy and secure cryptographic circuits. In this section, we explain the
energy-efficiency and security performance of the CCAL logic gates. We
have compared the simulation results of the CCAL logic gate with CMOS,
2-EE-SPFAL [9], and 2-SPGAL [10] logic gates.
The energy consumption in medical devices should be as minimal as possible. Further, to build a secure circuit the variation in energy consumption
for input combination variation should be ideally zero. The CPA calculates
the correlation between hypothetical power traces of all possible keys and
collected power traces from the circuit. Uniform power traces disguise the
linear dependency. To look at this feature at the circuit level, we check the
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Figure 6.2: CCAL-based XOR logic gate waveform with 2N2P-PCG integrated into the design.
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energy performance of the logic gate at all possible change in input values.
Z T
VP IP dt
(6.1)
E=
0

The energy consumption is the integration of the product of voltage (Vp )
and current (Ip ), i.e. power consumption for input signal [167]. We built
CCAL logic gates using 45nm technology and considered the load of 10
fF. Further, the energy and security performance of adiabatic logic circuits
largely depends upon the PCG integrated into the design. Therefore, the
energy and security metric performance was evaluated for logic gates with
2N2P-PCG integrated into the design. We target particularly low-frequency
medical device encryption, therefore, the frequency range of 50 kHz to 250
kHz is considered.
The variation in energy consumption value provides more insight than
observing the current traces. We used SPICE simulation to collect energy
consumption value for a total of 22n possible cyclic variations in the n-bit
circuit. The energy consumption values can be used in Equation 2.7 and
2.8 equation to calculated NED and NSD value. For ideal conditions, equal
energy consumption results in zero NED and NSD values. However, for practical scenarios, the NED and NSD value should be as low as possible. Having
lower NED and NSD value results in less correlation between hypothetical
and actual power traces. Thus, the circuit can protect the stored encryption
key.
It is very important to observe the energy saving in CCAL compared to
other logic gates. For equal comparision, the dual rail logic circuits 2-EESPFAL [9] and 2-SPGAL [10] are designed with 2N2P-PCG integrated into
the design, similar to the CCAL counterpart. For the energy performance
metric, we have listed E min , E max and E avg . A smaller difference between
E min , and E max indicates the energy consumption across all possible input
combinations is smaller and results in a better secure circuit. Further, the
E avg for each logic gate should be as low as possible for better energy efficiency.
Table 6.1 shows the comparison of CCAL AND logic gate with its counterpart in CMOS, 2-EE-SPFAL [9], and 2-SPGAL [10]. The CCAL AND
logic gate has the lowest E avg value for the frequency range of 50 kHz to 250
kHz. The CCAL AND logic gate has on an average of 4.7248 fJ E avg for the
frequency range of 50 kHz to 250 kHz. While in its CMOS, 2-EE-SPFAL
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Table 6.1: Energy-efficiency and security performance comparison for AND
logic gate.
50 kHz

100 kHz

Metric

CMOS 2-EE-SPFAL [9] 2-SPGAL [10] CCAL

CMOS 2-EE-SPFAL [9] 2-SPGAL [10] CCAL

E min (f J)
E max (f J)
E avg (f J)
NED (%)
NSD (%)

0.3745
38.0678
9.8487
99.02
117.08

Metric

CMOS 2-EE-SPFAL [9]

E min (f J)
E max (f J)
E avg (f J)
NED (%)
NSD (%)

0.1498
28.2615
7.2078
99.47
119.18

11.8596
12.1081
12.0227
2.05
0.60

9.1762
9.2971
9.2425
1.30
0.40

4.8398
5.3530
4.9780
9.59
3.55

0.1873
29.8538
7.6402
99.37
118.71

11.7577
11.9808
11.8864
1.86
0.57

11.1575
11.3861
11.2964
2.01
0.58

4.5769
5.1297
4.7216
10.78
4.24

2-SPGAL[10]

CCAL

CMOS

2-EE-SPFAL[9]

11.1185
11.3740
11.2804
2.25
0.67

4.5224
5.0853
4.6682
11.07
4.42

0.0749
25.1593
6.3756
99.70
120.26

2-SPGAL[10]

CCAL

11.7677
12.0363
11.9351
2.23
0.65

11.1600
11.4598
11.3488
2.62
0.78

4.3702
4.9547
4.5316
11.80
4.66

125 kHz

11.7009
11.9486
11.8591
2.07
0.59

250 kHz

[9], and 2-SPGAL [10] counterpart the average of E avg is 7.7681 fJ, 11.9258
fJ, and 10.7920 fJ. Therefore, we can conclude that the sinusoidal clocking
circuits on top of the PMOS and NMOS network help to reduce significant
energy consumption compared to conventional CMOS logic and also to its
dual-rail adiabatic logic counterpart. Table 6.2 summarizes the average energy saving (in %) in CCAL-based AND logic gate compared to its CMOS,
2-EE-SPFAL [9], and 2-SPGAL [10] counterpart.
Table 6.2: E avg - Energy saving (in %) in CCAL AND logic gate.
Type of the logic

Baseline Logic to compare

50 kHz

100 kHz 125 kHz

250 kHz

Dual-Rail Adiabatic

2-EE-SPFAL [9]
2-SPGAL [10]

58.60
46.14

60.28
58.20

60.64
58.62

62.03
60.07

Single-Rail

Conventional CMOS

49.46

38.20

35.23

28.92

For the secure encryption circuit design, it becomes important to check
the NED and NSD performance of the logic gate before building the larger
circuits. In this work, we primarily compared the NED and NSD value
of CCAL logic gates with their CMOS counterpart. The CMOS circuit is
considered the benchmark because has been shown to be vulnerable to CPA
attacks. Figure 6.3 and 6.4 shows the comparison of NED and NSD security
performance metrics for CCAL and CMOS AND logic gate. We can see that
CCAL AND logic gate has a significantly smaller value of NED and NSD
compared to CMOS AND logic. The average NED value for CCAL AND
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Figure 6.3: NED value comparison for AND logic gate.

Figure 6.4: NSD value comparison for AND logic gate.
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logic gate is 10.81% compared to 99.39% in its CMOS counterpart for the
frequency range of 50 kHz to 250 kHz. This results in 89.13% better NED
value in CCAL AND logic. Similarly, we can see an average of 96.45% better
NSD value in CCAL AND logic gate compared to its CMOS counterpart in
the same frequency range.
Table 6.3: Energy-efficiency and security performance comparison for XOR
logic gate.
50 kHz

100 kHz

Metric

CMOS 2-EE-SPFAL [9] 2-SPGAL [10] CCAL

CMOS 2-EE-SPFAL [9] 2-SPGAL [10] CCAL

E min (f J)
E max (f J)
E avg (f J)
NED (%)
NSD (%)

0.2459
32.5163
16.3697
99.244
69.537

Metric

CMOS 2-EE-SPFAL [9]

E min (f J)
E max (f J)
E avg (f J)
NED (%)
NSD (%)

0.1250
22.8099
11.4741
99.452
69.752

11.7161
11.7165
11.7163
0.003
0.001

11.1072
11.1077
11.1075
0.004
0.002

5.5896
5.6366
5.6114
0.833
0.284

0.1529
25.9986
13.0968
99.412
69.671

11.5779
11.5783
11.5781
0.004
0.002

11.0179
11.0184
11.0181
0.004
0.002

5.3592
5.3926
5.3775
0.619
0.210

2-SPGAL[10]

CCAL

CMOS

2-EE-SPFAL[9]

10.9915
10.9921
10.9918
0.006
0.003

5.3095
5.3643
5.3405
1.1023
0.389

0.0919
22.7796
11.4466
99.597
69.906

2-SPGAL[10]

CCAL

11.6306
11.6313
11.6309
0.006
0.003

11.0635
11.0642
11.0638
0.007
0.003

5.2555
5.2870
5.2711
0.595
0.206

125 kHz

11.5692
11.5698
11.5695
0.005
0.003

250 kHz

Table 6.4: E avg - Energy saving (in %) in CCAL XOR logic gate.
Type of the logic

Baseline Logic to compare

50 kHz

Dual-Rail Adiabatic

2-EE-SPFAL [9]
2-SPGAL [10]

52.11
49.48

100 kHz 125 kHz
53.55
51.19

53.84
51.41

250 kHz
54.68
52.36

Single-Rail

Conventional CMOS

65.72

58.94

53.46

53.95

Similar to the AND logic gate, we repeated the simulation experiment
for the XOR logic gates for all four logic designs in consideration. Table
6.3 lists the summary of simulation results for the XOR logic gate for the
frequency range of 50 kHz to 250 kHz. We can see in Table 6.3 that the
CCAL XOR logic gate has superior energy performance results. The average
of avg value, for the frequency range of 50 kHz to 250 kHz, in the CCAL
XOR logic gate is 5.40 fJ. However, in the same CMOS, 2-EE-SPFAL [9],
and 2-SPGAL [10] counterparts have an average of avg values are 13.0968
fJ, 11.6237 fJ, and 11.0453 fJ. Table 6.4 saving lists the energy saving in
CCAL XOR logic gate compared to single-rail counterpart, CMOS, and dualrail adiabatic logic counterpart 22-EE-SPFAL [9], and 2-SPGAL [10]. The
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CCAL XOR logic gate saves on an average more than 58% energy compared
to CMOS, and 53% and 51% more energy saving compared to 2-EE-SPFAL
[9], and 2-SPGAL [10] based XOR gate respectively.

Figure 6.5: NED value comparison for XOR logic gate.
Figure 6.5 and 6.6 graphically show the comparison of NED and NSD
security metric performance for CCAL and CMOS XOR logic gate. Similar
to the AND logic gate, the CCAL based XOR logic gate is superior in NED
and NSD security metric performance. The CCAL XOR logic gate has an
average of 99.23% better NED value compared to the CMOS XOR logic gate
over the frequency range of 50 kHz and 250 kHz. Further, an average of
99.61% better NSD value is noted for the CCAL XOR logic gate compared
to its CMOS counterpart in the same frequency range.
Figure 6.7 helps to understand the relation between the E avg and supply voltage at frequency value 100 kHz, for CCAL-based XOR logic gate,
with 2N2P-PCG integrated into the design. We also plotted the corresponding NED and NSD value along with E avg on the same graph. We see that
E avg is decreasing with lowering the supply voltage. However, the security
performance metric NED and NSD are higher with low supply voltage. The
CCAL-based XOR logic gate shows better security performance as the supply
voltage reaches a higher value. The better security performance is attributed
to the minimum deviation in energy number.
It is important to note that NED and NSD values in CCAL logic gates
are relatively better in dual-rail adiabatic logic (2-EE-SPFAL [9], and 297

Figure 6.6: NSD value comparison for XOR logic gate.

Figure 6.7: E avg , NED and NSD metric in CCAL-based XOR logic gate as
a function of the supply voltage.
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SPGAL [10]) compared to single-rail adiabatic logic CCAL. This is expected
behavior as dual-rail circuit uses two balanced switching logic evaluation
networks F and F . The switching in the evaluation block happens in a
complementary fashion. Thus, the more uniformity in current results in logic
gate output. However, for practical side-channel attacks (e.g. CPA in our
case), it becomes important to check whether the CCAL based encryption
circuit can prevent the revelation of the encryption key. The later part of the
paper explains the CPA attack performance results over CCAL logic-based
case-study implementation of the lightweight cryptographic cipher.

6.4

A Cryptographic Circuit Case-Study:
PRESENT-80 S-box

In this section, first, we provide background information on lightweight cryptographic cipher PRESENT. The Substitution-box (S-box) is a vital component in the PRESENT cipher. We use the S-box as case-study implementation and show the comparison of transistor count implementation in adiabatic
logic CCAL, 2-EESPFAL [9] and 2-SPGAL [10]. We also provide energy and
security metric performance of the case-study design with 2N2P-PCG integrated into the design.

6.4.1

Importance of S-box in PRESENT-80

The cryptographic cipher used in medical devices should be low-power and
lightweight as they run on battery and have limited silicon space. PRESENT
is one such popular lightweight cryptographic cipher [5]. Further, the counter
mode operation in the PRESENT makes it suitable in challenge-response
authentication [166]. The PRESENT comes in two variants based on the
key size, 80-bit or 120-bit. The PRESENT-80, is an 80-bit key variant with
a total of 32 rounds of encryption. In PRESENT-80, the first 31 rounds of
encryption are identical and its schematic is shown in Figure 6.8.
The PRESENT-80 has three fundamental operations. First, the plain
text is XORed with 64 bits of the key. During the second operation, the
Substitution-box (S-box) does a non-linear transformation of the 4-bit blocks,
with a total of 16 such operations happening in parallel. The last operation
is the permutation of S-box output to create further randomization. The Sbox is the key constituent of PRESENT-80. Therefore, in this work, we have
99

Figure 6.8: one round of PRESENT-80 implementation using 2-phase adiabatic logic [10] (© 2021 IEEE).
evaluated the transistor counts, energy efficiency, and security metrics performance comparison for S-box for 2-EE-SPFAL [9], 2-SPGAL [10], CCAL,
and CMOS.

6.4.2

Transistor Count Saving analysis in CCAL-based
case-study implementation of PRESENT- 80 Sbox

We can see from Figure 6.8 that S-box is a critical part of the PRESENT-80
implementation. In this section, we explain the S-box circuit implementation
using four different logic circuits, i.e. 2-EE-SPFAL [9], 2-SPGAL [10], CCAL,
and CMOS.
Table 6.5: Transistor count in PRESENT-80 S-box designed using dual-rail
logic.
Logic
Gates

Number of
Logic Gates

Buffer
AND
OR
XOR

12
16
8
7

Total Transistor Counts
2-EE-SPFAL [9] 2-SPGAL [10]
96
224
112
84

72
192
96
70

Table 6.5 illustrates the number of the transistors required to implement
PRESENT-80 S-box using dual-rail adiabatic logic. The dual-rail adiabatic
logic inherently works in pipeline fashion. In other words, the successive
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blocks of the circuits operate on different phases. In case of 2-phase clock,
they are in-phase and out-of-phase [9] [10]. In order to make the output
appear on the same clock phase, we need to put extra buffers for synchronization.
Table 6.6: Transistor count in PRESENT-80 S-box designed using single-rail
logic.
Logic
Gates

Number of Total Transistor Counts
Logic Gates CCAL
CMOS

AND
OR
XOR
XNOR

16
8
4
4

128
64
40
48

96
48
32
40

Table 6.6 represents the number of logic gates and transistor count for
PRESENT-80 S-box implemented using single-phase logic. The PRESENT80 S-box implementation using CCAL is similar to CMOS-based implementation, except it requires two complementary sinusoidal power clocks and two
extra transistors for clocking circuitry on top of the logic evaluation network.
In the previous section, we have seen that the CCAL logic gates require significantly less energy consumption, as well as improve the resilience against
the CPA attack.
Table 6.7: Transistor count comparison for CCAL, 2-EE-SPFAL [9], 2SPGAL [10] and conventional CMOS for PRESENT-80 S-box design.
Logic

Number of
Transistors

Overhead compared Transistor Saving
to CMOS, in %
in CCAL, in %

2-EE-SPFAL [9]
2-SPGAL [10]

516
430

138.89
99.07

45.74
34.88

CCAL
CMOS

280
216

29.63
–

–
–

Table 6.7 presents the comparison of the number of transistors required
to implement PRESENT-80 S-box for different logic. The dual-rail adiabatic
logic has more balanced switching activities, thus resulting in a more secure
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structure against CPA. However, the inherent structure of dual-rail logic
results in more transistor counts. The transistor count overhead in 2-EESPFAL [9], and 2-SPGAL [10] compared to their CMOS-based S-box counterpart is approximately 139% and 99% respectively. On the other hand, the
transistor overhead in CCAL based CMOS is 29.63%. Further, the CCAL
based S-box implementation saves 34.88% and 45.74% of transistor count
compared to dual-rail logic 2-EE-SPFAL [9], and 2-SPGAL [10] respectively.
For the space-limited IoT structure, the CCAL logic presents an alternative
to design secure cryptographic circuits with less transistor overhead.

6.4.3

Energy and Security Performance Evaluation of
Case-Study Design PRESENT-80 S-Box

The CCAL based logic gates shows promising results for the NED, and NSD
metrics. The CPA attack collects the power traces at the output of the S-box,
thereby it is a vital component of the PRESENT-80 design. We implemented
the S-Box design using the proposed CCAL and CMOS logic gates. The SBox implementation requires both V P C and V P C phases (Figure 6.8) of
power clock to operate. The S-box designs using adiabatic logic were tested
with 2N2P-PCG.
Table 6.8 lists the energy-efficiency performance and calculated NED and
NSD metrics. The energy consumption for adiabatic circuits was calculated
for 2N2P-PCG integrated into the design. Similar to the logic gates, we
collected the energy number in SPICE simulation for the frequency range 50
kHz to 250 kHz. The PRESENT-80 S-box circuit was designed at 45 nm
technology and the load value was considered 10 fF. We can see in Table
6.8 that CCAL based S-box shows better energy performance than CMOS,
2-EE-SPFAL [9] and 2-SPGAL [10] over frequency range 50 kHz to 250 kHz.
The average of E avg for CCAL based S-box is 74.23 fJ for the frequency range
50 kHz to 250 kHz. For the same frequency range, the average of E avg in
CMOS, 2-EE-SPFAL [9] and 2-SPGAL [10] is approximately 1981 fJ, 110 fJ
and 80 fJ respectively. Therefore, adding a clocking network on top of the
pmos and nmos circuit helps to reduce the energy consumption value.
Similar to logic gate, it is interesting to see the NED and NSD performance between CCAL and CMOS. Figure 6.9 and 6.10 shows graphical comparison for NED and NSD values in CCAL and CMOS for S-box circuit. The
NED and NSD values in CCAL based PRESENT-80 S-box is overall lower
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Table 6.8: Energy-efficiency and security performance comparison for
PRESENT-80 S-Box.
50 kHz
Metric

CMOS

E min (f J)
16.10
E max (f J) 24427.77
E avg (f J) 3713.30
NED (%)
99.93
NSD (%)
151.09

100 kHz

2-EE-SPFAL [9] 2-SPGAL [10] CCAL
111.87
120.24
116.37
6.96
1.28

CMOS

2-EE-SPFAL [9] 2-SPGAL [10] CCAL

80.08
84.09
81.48
4.78
0.96

72.13
82.20
78.58
12.24
2.07

8.05
13822.58
2251.87
99.94
147.00

106.80
114.36
110.34
6.62
1.31

78.38
84.51
80.04
7.25
1.18

68.41
78.10
74.46
12.41
2.10

2-EE-SPFAL [9]

2-SPGAL[10]

CCAL

CMOS

2-EE-SPFAL[9]

105.81
113.03
109.02
6.40
1.30

78.18
83.00
79.83
5.81
1.19

67.32
76.89
73.38
12.45
2.11

3.22
709.64
175.74
99.55
88.77

2-SPGAL[10]

CCAL

103.22
110.28
106.27
6.40
1.30

77.65
82.49
79.39
5.86
1.20

64.20
73.72
70.49
12.90
2.19

125 kHz
Metric

CMOS

E min (f J)
6.44
E max (f J) 11375.77
E avg (f J) 1785.21
NED (%)
99.94
NSD (%)
151.00

250 kHz

Figure 6.9: NED value comparison for PRESENT-80 S-box.
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Figure 6.10: NSD value comparison for PRESENT-80 S-box.
for the frequency range 50 kHz to 250 kHz. The average NED value for the
CCAL S-box is 12.50%, while in CMOS S-box it is 99.84% over frequency
range 50 kHz to 250 kHz. The CCAL based S-box shows overall 97.48%
improvement in NED security metric. Similarly, the NSD performance in
CCAL-based S-box is average of 2.12% over frequency range 50 kHz to 250
kHz. For same frequency range, CMOS-based S-box have an average NSD
value 134.46%. The CCAL-based S-box have overall 98.43% better NSD
performance for frequency range 50 kHz to 250 kHz.
Table 6.9: E avg - Energy saving (in %) in CCAL based PRESENT-80 S-Box.
Type of the logic

Baseline Logic to compare

50 kHz

100 kHz 125 kHz

250 kHz

Dual-Rail Adiabatic

2-EE-SPFAL [9]
2-SPGAL [10]

32.47
3.56

32.52
6.97

32.70
8.08

32.67
11.21

Single-Rail

Conventional CMOS

97.88

96.69

95.89

59.89

The CCAL-based S-box shows better security metric performance compared to its CMOS counterpart. We can see that CCAL-based S-box has better energy-efficiency performance compared to its dual-rail adiabatic counterpart. However, the dual-rail adiabatic logic, 2-EE-SPFAL [9] and 2-SPGAL
[10] have better NED and NSD performance. The better security performance in dual-rail logic is an attribute of the balance switching activities in
logic evaluation network. However, the CCAL has significant security per104

formance improvement compared to CMOS. It will be interesting to see the
performance of the CCAL based circuit against the CPA attack (explained
in the next section).

6.5

Effect of varying capacitor and inductor
in LC tank in 2N2P-PCG for energy efficiency and security performance analysis
in case-study
Q = 2π

Maximum Energy Stored
Energy Dissipated per Cycle

(6.2)

The Q factor is a key factor in the power analysis of the RLC resonator
circuit. When the adiabatic circuit is integrated with 2N2P-PCG (Figure
2.7) then it can be modeled as an RLC circuit. Equation 6.2 shows the
relation between the Q factor and average power dissipation. We need a
larger Q factor in order to have minimum power dissipation. However, in the
RLC circuit, the Q factor of the LC tank circuit depends upon the Q factor
of inductor and capacitor with their parasitic resistance [171].
Qtank = ω0 C (RL kRC ) = QL kQC

(6.3)

Equation 6.3 shows the dependence of the Q factor of 2N2P-PCG tank
circuit on Q factor of inductor (QL = ωR0LL ) and capacitor (QC = ω0 CRC )
respectively. In the above equations, RL is the parasitic resistance of the
inductor, and RC is the parasitic resistance of the capacitor [171]. Therefore,
we hypothesize that there will be a certain value of the inductor and capacitor
for which the Q factor is maximum. Higher Q can result in lower energy
dissipation. Further, it will also be interesting to see the effect on security
performance metrics.
To check our hypothesis, we fixed the frequency value to 100 kHz. We
calculated the different combinations of L and C (Equation 2.2) for the frequency 100 kHz. Similar to the logic gate energy and security experiment,
we collected energy consumption values for a total of 256 cyclic combinations
of the inputs in CCAL-based S-box circuitry. Figure 6.11 shows the E avg at
different capacitive value in LC tank circuit in 2N2P-PCG circuit. We can
see that the lowest E avg value of 74.46 fJ at capacitor value 100 fF.
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Figure 6.11: Effect of varying capacitor and inductor values over Average
energy consumption in PRESENT-80 S-box.

Figure 6.12: Effect of varying capacitor and inductor values over NED and
NSD in PRESENT-80 S-box.
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Further, we can also observe the effect on security performance metrics
NED and NSD. Figure 6.12 shows the change in NED and NSD values at
different values of the capacitors. The lowest NED and NSD values are observed are 4.79% and 1.40% at capacitor value 500 fF. The graph in Figure
6.12 helps to understand the capability of the circuit to thwart the Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack. The lowest value of NED and NSD
indicates that the circuit is more robust against CPA at 500 fF capacitance
value in 2N2P-PCG.

Figure 6.13: Energy-security trade-off in PRESENT-80 S-box designed using
CCAL.
We define the energy-security trade-off product as Energy × Security
and measure in Joule. Previously, we have seen that the energy and security
metrics performance shows the different trend for PCG tank capacitor CE
values. The case-study implementation shows optimum energy performance
for CE value of 100 fF and security performance at 500 fF. For optimum
energy and security performance, the trade-off product Energy × Security
should be minimum. Figure 6.13 shows an insight for the energy and security
performance metrics together at different tank capacitor values. We can see
that for capacitor value 200 fF has the lowest Eavg × N ED and Eavg × N SD
equal to 5.98f J and 1.07f J respectively. Thus, we can say that having 200
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fF value of tank capacitor (CE ) in 2N2P-PCG can provide optimum energy
and security performance together.

6.6

CPA attack simulation

In the previous section, we demonstrated the efficacy of the CCAL to design
low-energy and CPA resilient cryptographic circuits. The CCAL based S-box
was energy efficient, however, the NED and NSD performance were relatively
higher compared to Dual-Rail adiabatic logics 2-EE-SPFAL [9] and 2-SPGAL
[10]. In this section, we subject the CCAL based S-box design against the
CPA. The article [168] illustrates the procedure to carry out the CPA in
SPICE simulation. We can see in Figure 6.8 that one round of PRESENT80 encryption contains 16 identical blocks. Each block has four XOR logic
gates and a non-linear transformation circuit, called S-box. Therefore, the
output of S-box is considered as CPA attack point in the literature [10], [9],
[6].
The CPA attack requires the power traces collected from the attack point.
The SPICE simulation was performed with a load value of 10 fF to collect
the power traces. The simulation environment is noise-free and requires
fewer traces for successful CPA. If a CPA attack is carried out in a noisy
environment then it requires a larger number of traces. We collected power
traces for the CMOS-based PRESENT-80 S-Box. The CPA attacks reveal
the correct encryption key after 5120 power traces. Figure 6.14 shows the
correlation coefficient starts appearing different after 40 power traces. The
distinct power consumption, therefore, the current makes the CPA successful
over the CMOS-based S-box of PRESENT-80 encryption.
The CCAL based S-box has better NED and NSD performance compared
to CMOS. However, dual-rail adiabatic logic, e.g. 2-EE-SPFAL [9], and 2SPGAL [10] have better NED and NSD values. It becomes important to see
if CCAL based PRESENT-80 S-box is safe against the CPA attack. Similar
to CMOS, we collected 12,000 power traces for the CCAL based PRESENT80 S-box with 2N2P-PCG integrated into the design. Similar to our previous
work on dual-rail adiabatic logic, 2-EE-SPFAL [9] and 2-SPGAL [10], the
CCAL based S-box circuit protects the revelation of the encryption key.
Therefore, higher NED and NSD value in CCAL compared to dual-rail logic
does not affect the properties to protect the encryption key against the CPA
attack.
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Figure 6.14: Successful Revelation of Key=14 in on one round of PRESENT80 encryption designed with CMOS.
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Figure 6.15: Unsuccessful CPA attack on one round of PRESENT-80 encryption designed with CCAL and 2N-PCG.
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6.7

Summary

The cost and the reliability of the medical devices are the important factors
to consider while selecting a technology with adiabatic logic. Bulk MOSFET
at 45nm combined with adiabatic logic will provide a low-cost solution for
medical devices that can also provide an energy-efficient and secure solution.
Novel devices such as Junctionless MOSFET [172] [173]and Tunnel FET [174]
[175] can also be explored with adiabatic logic for developing low-power and
secure solutions. However, the designer should consider the cost and the
reliability of the emerging devices when combined with adiabatic logic while
making the design choice for medical devices. The low-frequency medical devices are vulnerable to side-channel attacks (e.g. Correlation Power Analysis
(CPA) attack). The conventional approach to improve the CPA resistance
results in an increase in power consumption. In this article, we used the single
rail adiabatic circuit design technique called Clocked CMOS Adiabatic Logic
(CCAL) to design cryptographic circuits in low-frequency medical devices.
CCAL shows encouraging energy-saving and security performance compared
to its dual-rail adiabatic logic and CMOS counterparts.
Further, the CCAL enables the designer to reduce the transistor count in
cryptographic hardware compared to existing solutions based on adiabatic
logic proposed in the literature. We also demonstrated the capability of the
CCAL based logic to thwart the CPA attack and protect the encryption key.
Therefore, CCAL can be a promising design choice for the designer of medical
devices to increase their battery longevity with improved CPA resistance
while keeping the transistor overhead to minimal. While designing single rail
adiabatic logic circuits, the stability in the outputs should be considered while
cascading the designs. The stable outputs can be produced by inserting the
flip-flop to sample the correct output at each stage [176]. Another alternative
approach to provide stable outputs could be to use noise reduction circuitry
that can be added to restore the signal degraded [177]. Some possible future
research direction would be to check the performance of the CCAL-based
circuit implementation with different types of Power Clock Generator, e.g.,
switch capacitor, stepwise charging, etc.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future
Directions
7.1

Conclusion

The burgeoning of smart computing devices and existing limitations security
have resulted in a significant rise in attacks in recent years. The security
framework developed should be readily adaptable to the existing infrastructure of smart computing devices. The objective of the research presented
in this dissertation is to design hardware security primitives (TRNG and
PUF) without incurring any additional hardware requirements. Secondly, to
develop energy-efficient cryptographic circuit design techniques that are secure against Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack, a type of side-channel
attack.
This dissertation highlights the importance of TRNG and PUF in generating the secure key, secure storage of the key, authentication, digital signature,
nonce bit, salt bit, and padding bit generation in cryptographic operations.
The existing TRNG and PUF come at the cost of additional transistor circuitry to be used as an entropy source, therefore, not suitable in space-savvy
smart computing devices. The research in this dissertation report presents
a novel way to explore the electrical response of the sensor as an entropy
source. The proposed methodology has two primary advantages compared
to existing TRNG and PUF. First, designing TRNG and PUF from existing sensor responses removes the need for additional dedicated hardware
requirements and is beneficial in area-constrained miniaturized smart com-
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puting devices. Secondly, the manufacturing process variation in each sensor
is different, thus, tempering or replacing the sensor will result in a different
response. Therefore, it enables to identify the physically compromised or
malicious hardware replacement.
The key contribution from this dissertation report can be summarized as
follow:
 The proposed TRNG and PUF prototypes are developed from existing
photoresistor and photovoltaic solar cell sensors. As per the current
statistic, 46% vulnerable IoT devices have at least one of the above
sensors. Therefore, the proposed TRNG and PUF prototypes can be
useful to improve existing security infrastructure.
 The proposed prototypes do not require additional interfacing hardware
between sensors and computing units. Thus, they can be an option for
space-limited smart computing devices. Further, the proposed prototypes can be easily posted over existing photoresistor and photovoltaic
solar cell sensor-based devices as a software update.
 The lightweight scrambling method proposed in the TRNG prototype
is suitable for limited computing devices, results in 32 times better
random bit generation rate than existing prototypes. The proposed
prototype has random bit entropy close to ideal value 1.
 We proposed a novel histogram-based technique to split the electrical
response of the photovoltaic solar cell sensor electrical response. The
proposed technique enables the integration of TRNG and PUF as one
structure. The integrated TRNG-PUF architecture has approximately
34% better TRNG throughput and quality performance of TRNG and
PUF response bits.
 To secure the cryptographic circuitry design inside the computing unit,
we specifically worked on energy recovery computing (i.e., adiabatic
circuit) that recovers the charge stored on load capacitor back to powerclocking circuitry rather than dissipating as heat in conventional CMOS
logic.
 The proposed 2-SPGAL, the 2-phase sinusoidal clocking implementation of Symmetric Pass Gate Adiabatic Logic (SPGAL) shows better
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energy efficiency and security performance for Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) cipher PRESENT compared to baseline CMOS.
 The 2-SPGAL shows improvement in security performance metrics,
Normalized Energy Deviation (NED) and Normalized Standard Deviation (NSD) compared to baseline CMOS logic used in conventional
cryptographic circuit design. Further, we also show that, unlike its
CMOS-based LWC cipher implementation, 2-SPGAL can withstand
the CPA attack and protect the key revelation.
 Lastly, we explore Clocked CMOS Adiabatic Logic (CCAL) to design
cryptographic circuitry. The CCAL based circuity is architecturally
close to CMOS and requires approximately 45% fewer transistor counts
compared to existing adiabatic logic-based implementation. Further,
The CCAL based cryptographic circuits show further improvement in
energy-saving compared to CMOS and its 2-phase adiabatic logic counterpart.
 Similar to the previously proposed 2-phase sinusoidal clocking counterpart (2-SPGAL), CCAL also thwarts the CPA attack and protects
the key. Therefore, the CCAL can be a promising circuit design choice
to implement cryptographic circuitry with better security performance
with increased energy performance.

The research explored in this dissertation presents an important step to
improve the security of both existing and future computing devices. The
work presented in Chapter 3, 4 and 5 have been reviewed by scientific community. The research presented in Chapter 6 is currently under review for
journal publication. The TRNG prototype and integrated TRNG-PUF prototype were designed using standard sensors and an ARM microcontroller.
The adiabatic logic work was evaluated using CAD tools, Cadence Virtuoso.
The simulation automation was realized in the Open Command Environment for Analysis (OCEAN) language and its use in the Cadence Virtuoso
Design Environment. We can conclude that the proposed research in this
dissertation can play a key role to improve the security in smart computing
devices.
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7.2

Future Work

In this dissertation, we explored the viability of designing the security primitives (e.g. TRNG and PUF) using the electrical response of the sensors.
We also presented the circuit designing technique that results in improved
energy efficiency and capability to withstand a CPA attack. However, the
security concern of future embedded computing will be always a growing concern. As a result, the security approaches based on the hardware will attract
significant interest in the future.
 We performed pre-layout schematic design, the simulation is performed
by considering the ideal wires. In reality, wires occupy up to 40%
of the area, thereby contributing a significant proportion to parasitic
capacitance and resistance. The post-layout simulation to understand
the effect of parasitic capacitance and resistance of micro-structures of
the circuit. The evaluation of the circuit performance in post-layout
gives higher confidence that the layout of the design will meet the
desired specifications.
 Another interesting research direction is to design energy recoverybased TRNG-PUF using adiabatic logic. The adiabatic logic designed
can be explored to design a low-power integrated TRNG-PUF design. The adiabatic logic operates on different phases and can result in
more randomization. The performance of the PUF can be tested for
power consumption analysis, uniformity, uniqueness, reliability, and
bit-aliasing. The performance of the TRNG can be tested using NIST
recommended Statistical Test Suite. Further, the energy consumption
of the adiabatic TRNG-PUF can be compared with existing SRAM
and magnetic memory-based integrated TRNG-PUF prototypes.
 The Integrated TRNG-PUF has less than 100% reliability performance
for the PUF. For the critical security application, the security reliability needs to be improved. The work in [178], and [179] proposes the
usage of Error-Correcting Codes (ECC) to improve the reliability. In
the future direction, the ECC can be combined along with the PUF
performance bit for improved reliability. Further, the performance of
the TRNG-PUF can be tested for temperature and humidity variations.
 The existing TRNG-PUF is designed based on dividing the Gaussian
probability distribution function into the static and dynamic parts.
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The technique to divide the non-Gaussian response of the sensor into
static and dynamic parts can be developed.
 After the silicon prototype of the adiabatic circuit-based prototype was
developed, the interface of the sensor-based TRNG and PUF with the
adiabatic cryptographic engine can be explored. In this problem, the
TRNG, and PUF can generate the key, salt bits, initialization vector
to be used in adiabatic logic-based cryptographic circuits. The secure
data transfer between TRNG-PUF and adiabatic circuits needs to be
established. The adiabatic PUF and sensor-based PUF can be used to
mutually authenticate the sensor and the cryptographic engine. The
successful completion of this problem will provide an alternate novel
hardware security primitive platforms for IoT security.
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